Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal from the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s conviction the Supreme Court exercised its discretion under Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.12(8)(a) and ordered the Commonwealth’s brief before this Court stricken and this appeal dismissed, holding that the Commonwealth failed to comply with section 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v).Defendant was found guilty of second-degree cruelty to animals. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred when it failed to grant Defendant’s motion for directed verdict. The Commonwealth filed a petition for rehearing, which the court of appeals denied. The Commonwealth then requested discretionary review from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review, and the parties filed briefs. The Supreme Court struck the Commonwealth’s brief from the record and dismissed its appeal, holding (1) because the Commonwealth failed to provide any support for its factual assertions in both its statement of the case and argument sections of its brief, it failed to meet the substantial requirement of pinpoint citations to the record specific in section 76.12; and (2) the Commonwealth did not make a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of sections 76.12(4)(c)(iv) and (v). View "Commonwealth v. Roth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of various crimes for his role as a complicitor in a home invasion, holding that there was no merit to the arguments Defendant raised in this appeal.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court correctly denied Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict; (2) the conviction of the principal actor to a lesser offense based on a plea agreement does not preclude the prosecutor from pursuing a greater offense against the complicitor at trial; (3) the trial court did not err in allowing certain testimony; (4) the admission of evidence of Defendant’s purported prior bad acts did not amount to reversible error; (5) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of cell phone use between Defendant and the principal actor; (6) no reversible error occurred from the trial court’s exclusion from evidence of a photograph showing Defendant in the hospital four days after the home invasion; and (7) the trial court did not err when it did not poll the jury after the foreperson reported an apparent mistake regarding Defendant’s recommended sentence. View "Probus v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of murder and two counts of tampering with physical evidence, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant’s motions for directed verdict on the charges of tampering with physical evidence; (2) no reversible error occurred from the trial court’s jury instructions on protection of another; and (3) the trial court did not err when it allowed the Commonwealth to introduce several photographs of the victim’s body. View "Clark v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and their corresponding sentences, holding that Appellant’s claims of trial error did not warrant reversal of his convictions.A jury convicted Appellant of seventeen counts, including six counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion by failing to sever the counts of the indictments; (2) did not err in allowing evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts; (3) erred by allowing pornographic images into evidence without the victim’s identification, but the error was harmless; (4) did not abuse its discretion in disallowing cross-examination regarding the pornographic evidence; (5) did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony regarding anal sodomy; (5) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the complaining witnesses to be referred to as victims; and (6) did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial. View "Whaley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s post-conviction motion requesting that the trial court declare him to be intellectually disabled, which would preclude the imposition of the death penalty, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.130(2), a statute with an outdated test for ascertaining intellectual disability, is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Defendant was sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a teenage girl. Eventually, Defendant filed a Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and 60.03 motion alleging that he is intellectually disabled. The trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a hearing consistent with this opinion, holding that section 532.130(2) does not go far enough in recognizing that, in addition to ascertaining intellectual disability using a bright-line test to determine death-penalty-disqualifying intellectual disability, prevailing medical standards should always take precedence in a court’s determination. View "Woodall v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court ordering that the results of blood alcohol tests obtained by the police be suppressed, holding that no statutory violation occurred in this case.After Defendant was arrested, the arresting officer read the pertinent portion of the statutory implied consent warning to Defendant and asked him to submit to an intoxilyzer test. Defendant agreed to do so, and the result of the test was a .266 blood alcohol level. The district court denied Defendant’s motions to suppress his .266 intoxilyzer result and to dismiss his third offense DUI charge. The circuit court reversed, determining that Defendant had been denied his statutory right to obtain an independent blood test and that his due process right had been violated since the results of the independent test may have provided exculpatory evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Defendant failed to argue that any additional assistance by the officer could have resulted in Defendant obtaining a blood test, no statutory violation occurred; and (2) Defendant received due process. View "Commonwealth v. Riker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of first-degree robbery, kidnapping, third-degree burglary, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender and sentence of fifty years’ imprisonment, holding that none of Defendant’s claims on appeal had merit.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s eyewitness expert testimony; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to prohibit law enforcement officers from presenting expert testimony regarding boot prints and infrared cameras; (3) the photo pack shown to the victim was not unduly suggestive; and (4) there was no error, let alone cumulative error warranting reversal. View "Welch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating Defendant’s sentence as a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree to ten years’ imprisonment in connection with his conviction of third-degree assault on the grounds that Defendant’s second trial violated his rights against double jeopardy, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution.After a mistrial, the Commonwealth indicted Defendant as a PFO, first-degree. After a second trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s retrial was barred by both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions because jeopardy had clearly and unrefutably attached in Defendant’s case and there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. View "Commonwealth v. Padgett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of first-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment and sentence of sixty years as a persistent felony offender, holding that any error in the proceedings below was harmless.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in failing to appoint Defendant substitute counsel; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in advising Defendant of the right to or appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; (4) any error in the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under the Rape Shield Law was harmless; and (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising Defendant of his right to recall a witness. View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth’s petition for a writ to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s order authorizing the use of public funds for the procurement of private-expert assistance in William Meece’s post-conviction proceedings under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the use of public funds.Meece moved to vacate his judgment of conviction under Rule 11.42. Meece requested the use of private experts in proving his motion. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Meece’s public-funding request after holding an ex parte hearing. The Commonwealth then filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, arguing that the trial court erred in authorizing the use of public funds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in holding the ex parte hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to the requested state funds; and (2) the circuit court’s hearing to determine whether Meece was entitled to public funds for the procurement of private experts was not premature. View "Commonwealth v. Honorable John R. Grise" on Justia Law