Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Brian Moore was convicted of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of Virgil Harris and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Appellant unsuccessfully sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence at both the state and federal levels. Appellant then pursued post-conviction DNA testing under Ky. Rev. Stat. 422.285 in the circuit court. Appellant came before the Supreme Court seeking additional DNA testing beyond that ordered below or, in the alternative, to vacate his conviction and sentence for several reasons, including the post-trial loss of evidence that was to be tested for DNA. The Commonwealth cross-appealed as to several issues. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the circuit court, holding (1) the Commonwealth's cross-appeal was without merit; and (2) although Appellant did not demonstrate that his conviction and sentence should be vacated, the circuit court erred in reading its power to order independent DNA testing to be limited by statute. Remanded. View "Moore v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Shannon Straub was arrested by a police officer, who took her to a hospital emergency department for examination. After Straub became combative, hospital personnel physically restrained Straub, gowned her, applied restraints, drew blood, and extracted a urine sample. After suing unsuccessfully in federal court, Straub brought an action in the state trial court against Defendants, the emergency room doctor, the hospital, its employees, the police officer, and the city. In her complaint, Straub alleged that Defendants violated her rights under the Kentucky Constitution and asserted various common law tort claims. The trial court dismissed before trial Straub's claims that the hospital defendants deprived Straub of her due process interests under the Kentucky Constitution. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict for all Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. At issue on appeal was whether an individual can bring a civil action for money damages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.070 on the basis of an alleged violation of a provision of the Kentucky Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment, holding that section 446.070 does not provide money damages for alleged violations of the state Constitution. View "St. Luke Hosp. v. Straub" on Justia Law

Appellant Sean Noakes was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant was not entitled to a complete acquittal on the murder charge, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the murder charge; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including the language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 504.020(2) in its insanity instruction; (3) because Appellant tendered the first-degree manslaughter instruction based on extreme emotional disturbance, Appellant was barred from arguing it as a basis on this appeal to reverse his conviction; and (4) the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct throughout the trial. View "Noakes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeremy Lawton was convicted of escape in the second degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charge of second-degree escape, (2) whether the instruction for second-degree escape was flawed and constituted palpable error, and (3) whether the evidence presented supported an instruction for third-degree escape. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals on the issues of the motion for directed verdict and the instruction for third-degree escape, but (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for second-degree escape because an essential element was missing from the jury instruction for second-degree escape such that it actually established a different, uncharged crime, and therefore, the instruction constituted palpable error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Lawton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Christopher Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine, receipt of stolen property, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Chavies was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld Chavies's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Chavies's motions to suppress evidence seized during a search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict for the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of Chavies's amended and dismissed charges in the penalty phase of the trial, but the erroneous introduction of the charges did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding and therefore did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant Peter Bard was charged with murder but was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellant was involuntarily institutionalized for treatment for a total of 1,449 days while he was charged. After he had regained competency, Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter. The circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence after addressing Appellant's presentencing custody credit, which was calculated at 3,086 days. Six years later, Appellant was released from custody but reincarcerated after the Department of Corrections (Department) discovered the alleged error in the calculation of Appellant's custody credit and concluded that Appellant should not have been discharged. The circuit court judge then approved and signed an amended time credit sheet prepared by the Department that reduced Appellant's presentencing custody credit to 1,449 days. Appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court deem the judgment against him satisfied. The court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to modify Appellant's presentencing custody credit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Appellant in the trial court's sentence because the alleged error in this case was judicial. View "Bard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions. View "York v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate. View "Turpin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements. View "Stanton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law