Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of trafficking in marijuana over five pounds and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of Appellee's prior bad conduct in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 404(b); and (2) the prosecutor improperly misstated the facts during closing arguments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the admission of the prior bad act evidence was proper; and (2) the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence in his closing argument was a harmless error because his correction of his misstatement cured any prejudicial effect that might otherwise have arisen. View "Commonwealth v. Tramble" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers apprehended Defendant's friend, Justin Masengale, Susan Martin identified Masengale as one of two assailants who grabbed her purse and struck her in the face. Masengale was then transported to the police station, where he identified Defendant as the other assailant. Masengale moved to suppress the out-of-court identification by Martin, arguing that it was tainted by pre-identification actions by the police. Defendant joined in Masengale's motion, arguing that Masengale's identification of him was tainted because Martin's identification of Masengale was tainted. The trial court denied the motions to suppress after a hearing at which Martin did not testify. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to determine that Martin's out-of-court identification of Masengale was reliable absent Martin's testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in finding (1) the circumstances surrounding the show-up identification by Martin were unduly suggestive; but (2) Martin's show-up identification of Masengale was reliable. View "Commonwealth v. Parker" on Justia Law

Appellee was indicted for murder for the shooting death of her husband. Appellee admitted that she killed her husband but claimed she was acting in self-defense. The jury acquitted Appellee of the murder charge but found her guilty of the lesser offense of reckless homicide. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the conviction, determining that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a reckless homicide conviction and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on that offense. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the reckless homicide instruction was properly given in this case. View "Commonwealth v. Hasch" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree burglary and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to a total sentence of fifteen years. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Appellant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the identification made during a photo lineup and the in-court identification made at trial were impermissible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in the pre-trial identification procedure or in a witness's identification of the Appellant in trial; and (2) the testimony given about the fingerprints lifted off a piece of evidence was not erroneously admitted. View "Barnes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary, first-degree criminal mischief, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender. Defendant requested that he represent himself in the jury trial. The trial court appointed standby counsel for Defendant despite his objection. At trial, the court restricted the range of Defendant's self-representation by barring him from all bench conference and allowed only standby counsel to participate. After the trial, Defendant was convicted and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment as a persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's restriction of standby counsel at bench conferences in lieu of Defendant himself or hybrid counsel violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights by leaving Defendant unrepresented at these critical stages in the trial proceeding. View "Allen v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Loretta Glover filed a domestic violence petition alleging that Phillip Sitar had sexually abused Glover's daughter. The trial court subsequently entered emergency protection and domestic violence orders (EPO and DVO) restraining Sitar from having any contact with Glover and her daughter. More than sixty days after entry of the DVO, Sitar filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02(e) motion asking that the order be declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the EPO and DVO. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed without addressing the merits of the issues raised by Sitar, holding that Sitar failed to timely file an appeal, and therefore, the issues raised by Sitar were not properly before the court of appeals. View "Sitar v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony incest for having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor under the age of twelve. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court issued erroneous jury instructions on his incest charge that denied him a unanimous verdict. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) an error in the jury instructions deprived Defendant of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (2) Defendant's retrial for felony incest was not proscribed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to use or manufacture methamphetamine, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of the house at which Appellant was found carrying methamphetamine precursors, as Appellant lacked sufficient standing to challenge the validity of the warrantless search; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict based on the Commonwealth's failure to disprove entrapment, as no reasonable juror could have concluded that Appellant was entrapped and not guilty of the crimes charged. View "Mackey v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to charges of murder, first-degree burglary, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion collaterally attacking his sentence and conviction, claiming that his guilty plea should be set aside as involuntary because he believed the trial judge had agreed to sentence him to life without parole and because his trial counsel bullied him into entering the guilty plea. The trial judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on whether there was judicial interference in the plea process and whether Defendant was coerced by his counsel. After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial judge denied Defendant's motion for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the proof showed no judicial interference in the plea process and that Defendant's counsel did not threaten or otherwise coerce him into pleading guilty. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, an inmate, allegedly assaulted another inmate. After a disciplinary report was submitted against Appellee, the Adjustment Committee (Committee) determined that Appellee was guilty of the infraction and sentenced Appellee accordingly. Appellee appealed the decision and filed a petition for declaration of rights, arguing that the Committee's reliance on information obtained from confidential informants violated his constitutional due process rights. After a rehearing, the Committee again declared Appellee guilty of the infraction. The trial court ultimately dismissed Appellee's petition, concluding that the Committee did not violate Appellee's due process rights. The court of appeals reversed, determining that there was insufficient evidence of the disciplinary charge against Appellee to pass the "some evidence" standard pronounced in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Wadpole v. Hill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee, relying solely on the confidential informants' information, failed to supply some evidence to support its finding that the confidential informants and their information were credibl; and (2) accordingly, Appellee's due process rights were violated. View "Haney v. Thomas" on Justia Law