Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of robbery, burglary, unlawful imprisonment, receiving stolen property, and being a persistent felony offender (PFO). Appellant was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the trial court erred when it misinformed Appellant that he could not proceed to trial with a hybrid form of representation and therefore denied Appellant his right to represent himself for one pretrial motion while still retaining the services of counsel for the remainder of the proceedings; and (2) because the trial judge misstated the law, reversal and a new trial were necessary. View "Mitchell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The jury also found Appellant guilty of being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the first-degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an enhanced sentence of twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, the rule prescribing the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the trial court properly relied on that rule in this case; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly characterized Appellant’s PFO status, but the mischaracterization was not palpable error. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, an experienced criminal attorney, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for the tax years 2002 through 2006. Appellee proceeded pro se until a day before the jury trial was scheduled to begin, at which point Appellees requested a continuance for the purpose of possibly retaining private counsel. The trial court overruled the motion for a continuance. At no stage during the proceedings did the court conduct a Faretta hearing. Appellee was subsequently found guilty of five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, fleeing or evading police, and being a persistent felony offender. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 motion seeking relief from the judgment by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Appellee was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing, concluding that Appellee’s allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not clearly refuted by the record. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Appellee’s Rule 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing because a hearing was not necessary to determine that Appellee was not prejudiced by any errors of trial counsel regardless of whether those errors amounted to unprofessional performance. View "Commonwealth v. Searight" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading the police, first-degree illegal possession of a controlled substance, and second-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender (PFO) to twenty years' incarceration. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.40, which prescribes the number of peremptory challenges in a criminal case, is valid, and the Court has the authority to promulgate that rule and all other rules of practice and procedure in the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth improperly mischaracterized Appellant's PFO status during closing arguments of the PFO guilt phase trial, but the error was not palpable. View "Glenn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee, a licensed attorney with experience in the practice of criminal law, was indicted on five counts of failure to file Kentucky tax returns for several years. Prior to trial, Appellee appeared on his own behalf, but one day before jury trial was to begin, Appellee requested a continuance to retain private counsel. The trial judge overruled the motion without holding a formal Faretta hearing. After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted on five counts of failing to file a state tax return. The court of appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment, holding that criminal defendants who are experienced criminal trial attorneys are not entitled to a Faretta hearing or inquiry prior to representing themselves. View "Commonwealth v. Ayers" on Justia Law

In Haydon Bridge I, the Supreme Court held that provisions of the 2000-2002 and 2002-2004 budget bills, which suspended annual General Fund appropriations to the Benefit Reserve Fund (BRF) were constitutional but that other provisions of the bills ordering funds transferred from the BRF to the General Fund were unconstitutional. On remand, the trial court granted permanent prospective relief prohibiting the future transfer of funds from the BRF to the General Fund or other state agencies and ordered retroactive injunctive relief requiring the Governor and State Budget Director (collectively, "the Governor") to return monies that had been transferred from the BRF to the General Fund from 2000 to 2010. The court's order addressed, among other things, transfers from the part of the BRF known as the Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis Fund. The Governor appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the retroactive injunctive relief ordered by the trial court violated sovereign immunity and the separation of powers; (2) there was no basis for the trial court's award of attorneys' fees; and (3) because Plaintiffs had no standing with regard to the Pneumoconiosis Fund, the trial court should not have enjoined transfers from that Fund based on a request from Plaintiffs. View "Beshear v. Haydon Bridge Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to second-degree possession of a controlled substance and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized upon his arrest because the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe that Appellant had committed a misdemeanor offense by carrying a concealed deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an objectively reasonable police officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest Appellant for carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, the search and ultimate seizure of the evidence leading to Appellant's conviction were valid, and the circuit court thus did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. View "Vega v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses, including first-degree robbery and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not suffer prejudice when the trial court's voir dire procedure was not consistent with the applicable statutes and rules, as the procedure employed in this case did not constitute a substantial deviation from the proper method; (2) the trial court's use of Appellant's single prior felony conviction to establish the offense of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and to enhance Appellant's first-degree robbery sentences under the persistent felony offender statute did not constitute double enhancement; and (3) the trial judge properly concluded that a mistrial was not warranted after a juror had contact with a victim-witness. View "Oro-Jimenez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of complicity to murder and first-degree complicity to robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding that the trial court did not err by (1) denying Appellant's motions for mistrial after the Commonwealth repeatedly referenced two of Appellant's three co-indictees' guilty pleas in the presence of the jury; (2) admitting eighteen jail letters written between Appellant and a co-indictee as relevant evidence; (3) holding that Appellant's co-indictee had not waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, thus not implicating Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense due to the co-indictee's refusal to testify; and (4) denying Appellant's motion for mistrial after the jury briefly accessed inadmissible evidence during deliberations. View "Mayse v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law