Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) denied her motion to suppress statements she gave to police after a polygraph examination because she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her Miranda rights, and (2) failed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting Appellant's statements given to the police because, under the totality of the circumstances, nothing showed that Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her rights as to her post-polygraph interview with police; and (2) Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to give an instruction on first-degree manslaughter was not properly preserved and not subject to palpable-error review.View "Wise v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellee entered guilty pleas to three charges of theft by unlawful taking over $300. The final judgment provided that Appellee be placed on supervised probation for five years and pay restitution. After the expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Appellee's probation based upon his failure to pay restitution. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that, pursuant to Conrad v. Evridge, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to revoke Appellee's probation. In so holding, the circuit court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that Ky. Rev. Stat. 533.020(4) operated to automatically extend Appellee's probationary period so long as he failed to complete payment of the restitution as ordered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 533.020(4) authorizes a trial court to extend the duration of a sentence of probation only if such an extension is necessary for payment of restitution; and (2) upon expiration of Appellee's probationary period, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and was without authority to revoke Appellee's probation.View "Commonwealth v. Wright" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search of her vehicle during an investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to several drug-related charges and subsequently appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Defendant was detained for an unreasonably prolonged amount of time; and (2) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the stop beyond the time needed to complete a citation for a traffic violation. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding (1) Defendant was detained beyond the time necessary to effectuate the purpose of the traffic stop; but (2) the prolonging of Defendant's detention was justified by at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity.View "Commonwealth v. Bucalo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree assault and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed one of Appellant's convictions for first-degree assault, reversed the other conviction, and remanded, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to strike three prospective jurors for cause, failing to provide limiting instructions, or allowing a fact witness to present an expert opinion; (2) the Commonwealth's question to Appellant was to whether it was lawful for him to possess a firearm was not reversible error; but (3) the Commonwealth's proof did not support a conviction for one of the first-degree assault convictions.View "McDaniel v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants, two employees of the University of Kentucky, sued the University, claiming that the University breached contractual obligations to provide them with benefits under a long-term disability compensation program adopted by the University. The circuit courts denied the University’s motions to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed both circuit court decisions, holding that the University was entitled to governmental immunity. Appellants appealed, arguing that the documents of the University establishing the long-term disability compensation program constituted a written contract falling within the waiver of governmental immunity set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 45A.245. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were not based upon a written contract with the University, and therefore, sovereign immunity remained a valid affirmative defense under the circumstances of this case. View "Furtula v. Univ. of Ky." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the use of a weapon of mass destruction in the second degree for and attempted murder for installing a pipe bomb in a car. Appellant was sentenced to forty years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s conviction did not violate double jeopardy principles; (2) the trial court did not err in finding that serious physical injury occurred to the victim and in sentencing Appellant as a violent offender; (3) the trial court’s refusal to allow the jurors to use their notes during deliberations was not reversible error; and (4) Appellant was not wrongly denied his motion for directed verdict. View "Biederman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The 2008-2010 biennial budget bill, enacted by the General Assembly, provided for the transfer to the State’s general fund of over $10 million from funds created within the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction (HBC) and the transfer or $700,000 from the fund dedicated to the Department of Charitable Gaming (DCG). In two separate actions, licensed building contractors (collectively, “Klein”) and licensed non-profit organizations (collectively, “Soccer Alliance”) brought suit challenging the transfers. In Klein, the trial court ruled that the transfer of funds was lawful. In Soccer Alliance, the trial court ruled that the transfer transformed a lawful regulatory fee into an unlawful tax. The court of appeals panels affirmed in Klein and reversed in Soccer Alliance, concluding that the challenged transfers were lawful and did not constitute an unconstitutional tax. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the budget-bill transfers did not cross the line from lawful surplus to unlawful tax. View "Klein v. Flanery" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was found guilty of second-degree arson, second-degree burglary, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The trial court erred in its peremptory strike allocation during voir dire, but Appellee’s counsel failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Appellee subsequently filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 to vacate his sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that he would have used the two additional peremptory strikes denied to him by the trial court in striking two jurors. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Appellee’s allegations were not credible. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in relying on Shane v. Commonwealth in reversing the decision of the trial court; and (2) Appellee failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by not being able to strike the two jurors. View "Commonwealth v. Lawson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, of being a convicted felon in possession of a hand gun, and possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Appellant as a persistent felony offender to thirty-four years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by not instructing the jury on unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor as a lesser-included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) did not err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s motion to suppress items seized from his home, as the search was done pursuant to a valid search warrant. View "Rawls v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law