Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new sentencing trial. After a retrial, the jury again returned a death-penalty verdict. Appellant was sentenced in accordance with that verdict. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial and his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s murder conviction, to the extent it was challenged on appeal, and sentence of death, holding that (1) Appellant’s claims of error were either without merit or did not require reversal; and (2) the jury’s verdict was factually substantiated, and the sentence was valid. View "St. Clair v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of burglary, three counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, one count of theft by unlawful taking of property having a value of $500 or more, and of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing admission of detailed evidence of Defendant’s past domestic violence, as the evidence became an expose of Defendant’s extensive domestic misconduct, and the probative value of the evidence was clearly outweighed by its prejudicial nature; (2) Defendant’s convictions on the three separate counts of theft by unlawful taking of a firearm violated Defendant’s double jeopardy rights; and (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support the first-degree burglary conviction. View "Wilson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Marc Rosen, a retired senior status special judge who sought to become a candidate for circuit judge in the 2014 election, filed a declaratory judgment action contesting the constitutionality of HB 427, a statute that prohibits judges who have chosen to retire as a senior status special judge from becoming candidate for an elected office for five years after retirement. The circuit court found Rosen was disqualified from being a candidate under the terms of HB 427 without ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Rosen petitioned the court of appeals to set aside the circuit court order, and the court granted the motion. George W. Davis then initiated a writ action in the court of appeals, arguing that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to decide Rosen’s constitutional challenge. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Rosen’s declaratory action regarding the constitutionality of HB 427. View "Hon. George W. Davis, III v. Hon. Thomas D. Wingate" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by refusing to dismiss the entire jury venire after certain statements by a prospective juror instead of issuing an admonition; (2) erred in allowing the narration of security footage by witnesses, but the error was harmless; (3) improperly allowed speculative testimony regarding Defendant, but the error was harmless; and (4) did not err in finding Defendant to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree. View "Boyd v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant’s charges in this case stemmed from a search of his residence by his parole officers and local sheriff’s deputies. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to manufacturing methamphetamine and being a second-degree persistent felony offender and was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the products of the search of his home, as Appellant consented to the search and there was no indication that the consent was invalid; and (2) denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the results of lab testing on the products of the search, as the lab results were clearly admissible. View "Helphenstine v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 1983, Appellant, the owner and chief executive officer of an asphalt company, pled guilty to violating the Sherman Antitrust Act for unlawfully bidding on state highway construction contracts. In order to have his company's privilege of bidding on new contracts reinstated, Appellant agreed to cooperate with the Attorney General's (AG) investigation and proffered information pertaining to Appellant's involvement in a scheme to "rig" bids for highway construction contracts with the Kentucky Department of Transportation. In 2009, reporters for several newspapers submitted an Open Records Act (ORA) request to have the proffer disclosed. When Appellant learned the AG intended to release the proper, Appellant brought this action against the AG and ORA reporters seeking to have the release enjoined under the privacy exemption or the law enforcement exemption to the ORA. In 2011, the trial court ruled that the proffer should be released to the ORA requestors. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not have standing to invoke the law enforcement exemption provision to the ORA; and (2) matters of sufficient public interest warranted an invasion of Appellant's limited privacy interest in keeping his proffer from being disclosed.View "Lawson v. Office of Attorney Gen." on Justia Law

A writer for the Kentucky New Era, Inc., a newspaper serving the city of Hopkinsville and the neighboring area, requested records from the Hopkinsville City Clerk, including copies of arrest citations and police incident reports involving stalking, harassment, or terroristic threatening. The City Clerk withheld some records and redacted from others certain types of personal data. The City then initiated an action essentially seeking a declaration that its decisions to withhold and to redact records did not violate the Kentucky Open Records Act (ORA). The circuit court ultimately ruled that the City's redactions of social security and driver's license numbers, of home addresses, and of telephone numbers comported with the ORA. The court of appeals upheld the redactions and held that the City had the right to redact the names of all juveniles in the records. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly applied the ORA's privacy exemption in concluding that the redactions at issue in this case were in accordance with the ORA. View "Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville" on Justia Law

After the foreign language taught at Knott County Central High School was switched from French to Spanish, Grace Patton, the high school's French teacher, lost her job. Patton brought suit against Appellants - the Knott County Board of Education, individual Board members, the high school principal, the superintendent, and individual members of the school's Site-Based Decision-Making Council. Appellant's complaint did not specifically identify any particular claim or cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that (1) Patton's complaint had stated a claim against the school board under the whistleblower statute, and the evidence precluded summary judgment; and (2) the individual Appellants were not subject to qualified official immunity because the actions taken to Patton's detriment were ministerial, not discretionary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Patton did not state a claim under the whistleblower act and had no claim under the act under the facts as alleged; and (2) the individual Appellants were engaged in the performance of discretionary duties covered by the qualified official immunity doctrine.View "Knott County Bd. of Educ. v. Patton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other charges. The Supreme Court affirmed except as to Defendant's conviction for wanton endangerment, which the Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court did not violate Defendant's due process right to a fair trial by failing to remove two jurors for cause; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation by introducing a hospital laboratory report without the testimony of the person who prepared the report; but (3) the prosecution of the wanton endangerment charge violated Defendant's double jeopardy rights, and the wanton endangerment instruction violated Defendant's right to a unanimous verdict. Remanded.View "Little v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for the crimes of murder, wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana while in possession of a firearm. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges and sentenced to twenty-four years imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the trial court (1) did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to counsel by denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictments against him; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to police detectives because Appellant did not unambiguously invoke his right to an attorney; (3) did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the trafficking in marijuana charge; and (5) did not err by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth failed to redact portions of Appellant's recorded interview with the detectives.View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law