Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Each of these three consolidated cases originated with the filing of an action in the circuit court asserting claims against nursing home facilities for personal injuries suffered by a nursing home resident, violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.510 et seq., and for wrongful death of the resident. At the time of each resident’s admission to the nursing home, the resident’s attorney-in-fact executed a written document providing that disputes arising out of the relationship between the resident and the nursing home would be submitted to arbitration. When each case was commenced, the defendant nursing home moved the circuit court to compel the parties to submit the claims to a formal arbitration proceeding. The circuit court denied the motion in each case, concluding that the respective power-of-attorney instruments did not authorize the resident’s attorney-in-fact to waive the resident’s right to access to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) without a clear and convincing manifestation of the principal’s intention to do so, delegation to an agent of the authority to waive a trial by jury is not authorized, and the principal’s assent to the waiver is not validly obtained; and (2) the arbitration agreements in these cases were never validly formed. View "Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years. The two jury instructions under which Appellant was convicted directed the jury not to consider a specific event but broadly referred to a five-month period. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that, upon application of Johnson v. Commonwealth, Appellant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated because (1) at trial, the instructions given to the jury contained no distinguishing descriptions that would fairly apprise the jury of exactly which criminal episode it was charged to consider; and (2) the error was jurisprudentially intolerable. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Appellant argued that that his incriminating utterance to police during his arrest should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search, seizure, and arrest because the policy unlawfully located and identified him during the course of a protective sweep at a Louisville residence, which led to his unlawful arrest and incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that suppression of Appellant’s spontaneous utterance was not required because the police officers’ initial entry into the residence was consensual, the scope of the protective sweep was reasonable, the seizure of Appellant was lawful, and Appellant’s incriminating statement was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation. View "Simpson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Campbell County Fiscal Court adopted an ordinance replacing a monthly subscriber fee per landline telephone to fund the emergency 911 service in the County with an annual service fee levied upon each occupied individual residential and commercial unit within the county. Plaintiff, an apartment association, filed a declaratory action alleging that the ordinance was an unconstitutional and invalid exercise of the County’s authority. The trial court affirmed the ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fee imposed by the County to fund the emergency 911 service was a constitutional and statutorily valid exercise of its authority. View "Greater Cincinnati/N. Ky. Apartment Ass’n, Inc v. Campbell County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Defendants Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord were each convicted of wanton murder for having participated in the killing of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in both cases, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove two unqualified jurors for cause, and in accord with Gabbard v. Commonwealth, at least one of the trial court’s two erroneous failures to remove for cause was prejudicial; (2) the jury instructions raised certain unanimous verdict concerns; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Defendants too few peremptory juror challenges; and (4) the trial court erred by disallowing diversion-agreement impeachment cross-examination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Futrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from the search of the bedroom of a residence that police officers entered while executing a valid police warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) police may enter a suspect’s residence with a valid arrest warrant when they have reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence and can currently be found inside; and (2) the officers in this case did not exceed the scope of a lawful search under Payton v. New York. View "Barrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law