Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from the search of the bedroom of a residence that police officers entered while executing a valid police warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) police may enter a suspect’s residence with a valid arrest warrant when they have reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence and can currently be found inside; and (2) the officers in this case did not exceed the scope of a lawful search under Payton v. New York. View "Barrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law

After a trial, Appellant was found guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The Department of Corrections (DOC) originally classified Appellant as a non-violent offender but later reclassified Appellant as a violent offender, which changed Appellant’s parole eligibility and sentence expiration dates. The DOC modified Appellant’s status based on the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401. Appellant filed a declaration of rights petition in the circuit court arguing that the 2006 amendment to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401 constitutes an ex post facto violation. Appellant also moved to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment pursuant to Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 or, in the alternative, Ky. R. Crim. P. 60.02. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s Rule 11.42 motion and otherwise affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition for declaration of rights, holding that the 2006 amendment to section 439.3401 does not constitute an ex post facto law; but (2) reversed the denial of Appellant’s Rule 60.02(f) motion, holding that Appellant was denied due process of law when he proceeded with a jury trial under the false pretense that, if convicted, he would be treated as a non-violent offender. Remanded. View "Pate v. Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

In 2004, AT&T Corp. filed refund claims with the Finance and Administration Cabinet arguing that, under Ky. Rev. Stat. 139.505, AT&T was entitled to refunds for tax years 2002 and 2003. The Cabinet granted a partial refund for AT&T’s 2002 claim. In 2008, AT&T filed refund claims for tax years 2004 through 2008. In 2011, AT&T filed a declaration of rights action bringing administrative and as-applied constitutional challenges to the amendments to section 139.505. The circuit court dismissed the case, determining that AT&T’s challenges must be adjudicated by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals (KBTA) before the court would address AT&T’s facial constitutional challenges. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the facial constitutional issue was one that the KBTA could not decide, but that the other claims were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal, holding that there were several administrative issues that must be resolved prior to addressing the constitutional claims. View "Commonwealth v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two death-row inmates who filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking an order requiring the Governor and/or the Department of Corrections and/or the Kentucky Parole Board to adopt constitutionally adequate procedures regarding clemency petitions. Appellants further sought an order requiring the Parole Board to adopt administrative procedures governing the ways in which the Board must conduct clemency investigations. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that because Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution vests the power to grant pardons in the Governor it would violate the separation of powers for the courts to dictate to the Governor the procedures he should employ in considering pardons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ petition failed to state a claim for relief. View "Foley v. Beshear" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) flawed jury instructions denied Appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict, and the error required reversal of Appellant’s conviction; (2) a certain out-of-court statement was not subject to the hearsay rule and, therefore, was not admitted improperly; and (3) the Commonwealth did not improperly elicit testimony from a police officer that bolstered the credibility of the victim. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant, a member of a fraternity at the University of Kentucky, leased a room at the fraternity house. When a police detective learned that Appellant was selling marijuana at the fraternity house, he and two other detectives entered the fraternity house without a warrant. Upon knocking on the door to Appellant’s room, the officers were greeted by the strong smell of marijuana. Appellant was charged with one count of trafficking in a controlled substance within 1,000 yards of a school and other drug-related charges. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in his bedroom, arguing that the detectives unlawfully entered and searched the house in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Appellant subsequently pled guilty to the trafficking charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated Appellant’s guilty plea, holding that the detective were not welcome to enter the fraternity house at their own discretion, and therefore, the officers’ entry was unlawful. View "Milam v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Defendant made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his attorneys to request their assistance in withdrawing the plea, but defense counsel never acknowledged Defendant’s requests. Defendant orally asked to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he had entered the plea involuntarily as a result of the actions of his defense team. The court summarily denied the motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and ordered the case remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel refused or failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) Defendant was improperly denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel during that proceeding; and (3) Defendant’s remedy was the vacating of the judgment and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Tigue" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his right to an impartial jury was violated when a probation and parole officer served on his jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s acceptance of the juror at issue waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to strike the juror for cause; (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim was premature; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hear additional character testimony at final sentencing; and (4) the trial court did not err in failing to note Defendant’s presentence custody credit on the final judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Caraway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and taken into custody as a suspect for the murder of his mother. The circuit court halted the allegedly improper questioning of Defendant until Defendant was allowed access to a public defender. Defendant’s father obtained the order from the circuit judge, ex parte, purportedly under the authority of Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.14(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s issuance of the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 2.14(2) does not provide the trial court with authority to appoint counsel and intercede in the interrogation of an individual in custody before commencement of prosecution where, as a general matter, courts are not vested with general jurisdiction over a criminal matter until the criminal matter becomes a criminal case upon commencement of prosecution; and (2) a motion to suppress is the appropriate means to attack an allegedly improper interrogation resulting from the denial of access to counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Terrell" on Justia Law