Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution bars the Commonwealth from appealing a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.Here, the Commonwealth appealed Defendant’s judgment of acquittal on the charge of failing to register a change of address with the Sex Offender Registry. The Commonwealth argued that its appeal was not barred by section 115 because Defendant’s judgment of acquittal was based not on the jury’s verdict but on the trial court’s issuance of a judgment of acquittal. The court of appeals allowed the appeal to proceed and reversed the trial court’s judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 115 prevents the Commonwealth from appealing a judgment of acquittal. The Court overruled any precedent stating that section 115 derives itself from section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution and that the Commonwealth may appeal a judgment non-obstante verdicto (n.o.v.). View "Maupin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The court of appeals misapplied the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances of Defendant’s case from the perspective of an objectively reasonable trial attorney.The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42 post-conviction motion for a new sentencing-phase trial based upon ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court of appeals ruled that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising Defendant to enter into a sentencing agreement with the Commonwealth to waive jury sentencing and accept a plea agreement under which he was sentenced to the maximum penalty to avoid potential risks to his parole eligibility and meritorious credit against his sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals placed too much emphasis on Defendant’s agreeing to the maximum penalty. As to Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for relief for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the argument was without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Helm" on Justia Law

In this case involving an alleged denial of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly denied trial counsel’s motion to withdraw because, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant failed to demonstrate that his lawyer was burdened by an actual conflict of interest during his representation of Defendant.Defendant was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Once Defendant’s attorney discovered that he had a potential conflict, he filed a motion to withdraw as Defendant’s attorney. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred by failing to grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Muchrison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding the trial court’s suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a canine sniff search of Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop. The Court held that the court of appeals did not err by concluding (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was proper, but the sniff search improperly extended the traffic stop; (2) the traffic stop was the only legal justification for stopping Defendant; and (3) the Commonwealth failed to preserve for appellate review its claim that Defendant’s parole status subjected him to a warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of criminal attempt to commit murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and tampering with physical evidence and sentencing him to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) the trial court did not err in refusing to allow certain cross-examination of the victim; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial; and (4) the jury instructions on the possession of a handgun by a convicted felon charge did not deprive Appellant of his right to a unanimous verdict. View "Shively v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of incest, first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, first-degree unlawful imprisonment, and first-degree sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Defendant to seventy years’ imprisonment. In reversing in part, the Supreme Court held that Defendant’s convictions of incest, use of a minor in a sexual performance, and unlawful imprisonment were reasonably likely a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The court otherwise affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment due to prosecutorial vindictiveness; (2) did not err by not granting a directed verdict on the charge of unlawful transaction with a minor; (3) did not permit double jeopardy violations; and (4) erred by permitting the victim’s mother to improperly vouch for the victim’s credibility, but the error was harmless. View "Yates v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a traffic stop, holding that the law enforcement officer did not violate Defendant’s right to privacy when he reviewed Defendant’s license and registration information.The officer’s police car in this case was equipped with a camera that could read license plates in order to provide information about the vehicle’s registered owner. The record check performed by the camera indicated that Defendant had an active warrant for failing to appear in court. The officer pulled Defendant’s vehicle over and, after noticing several signs that Defendant was intoxicated, arrested Defendant for, inter alia, driving under the influence. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were not violated by the officer obtaining information linked to Defendant’s license plate, which was displayed in a place where Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) the officer had the articulable and reasonable suspicion required to stop the vehicle. View "Traft v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals ruling in favor of Appellee in this prison discipline case and reinstated the trial court’s order denying Appellee’s pro se declaration of rights action in which she argued that the disciplinary proceeding violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Appellee was disciplined as a result of an injury to a Corrections officer after a fight between Plaintiff and another inmate. The circuit court found that Appellee had received due process. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that Appellee’s procedural due process rights were not violated. View "Warden v. Lawless" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals remanding this matter to the circuit court for entry of an order requiring Utility Management Group, LLC (UMG) to comply with the Open Records Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.870-.884. The Pike County Fiscal Court made an Open Records request to UMG, which provided management and operational services to Mountain Water District, so that the Auditor of Public Accounts could determine the actual costs of the services UMG provided. UMG declined to produce the request documents, asserting that it was a “wholly private entity.” The Attorney General found UMG subject to the Open Records Act and required production. The circuit court, however, concluded that UMG had no disclosure obligation under the Act. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) at the time of Pike County Fiscal Court’s Open Records Act request, UMG was a public agency subject to the Act; (2) the 2012 amendment to section 61.870(1)(h) does not apply retroactively to relieve UMG of its disclosure obligation; and (3) the challenged 1994 version of section 61.870(1)(h) was and is constitutional. View "Utility Management Group, LLC v. Pike County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order denying Appellants’ separate motions to suppress evidence. As grounds for their motions, Appellants claimed that law enforcement officers violated the curtilage of their apartment when they entered the back patio enclosure and that the officers lacked any exigencies to enter the apartment and conduct the search. The trial court ruled that the protective sweep exception, the emergency aid exception, and the plain view exception all justified the warrantless search. The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that none of the exceptions relied upon by the trial court excused the warrantless search but that a second search was conducted pursuant to Appellants’ valid consents, thus purging the taint of the officers’ initial illegal search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the officers’ initial warrantless search of Appellants’ apartment was illegal; (2) the officers were unlawfully located on Appellants’ patio when they viewed marijuana baggies; and (3) Appellants’ consent to a subsequent search was not an act of free will sufficient to dissipate the taint of the initial illegal search. View "Pace v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law