Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The appellant was convicted of multiple offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, distribution of obscene material to a minor, use of a minor in a sexual performance, first-degree sexual abuse, and sixty-eight counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor. The charges arose from incidents in which the appellant, while babysitting two children, sexually abused an eight-year-old girl and, over a period of time, also abused a boy who lived with him. The investigation began after the girl disclosed the abuse to her mother, leading to police involvement, the seizure of the appellant’s cellphone, and the discovery of child pornography, including images of the boy.The Madison Circuit Court denied the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone, finding that the warrantless seizure was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was reasonable. At trial, the court admitted images of child pornography extracted from the cellphone, over the appellant’s objections regarding authentication and Confrontation Clause rights. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the convictions. The Court held that raw, machine-extracted data from the Cellebrite forensic tool is not testimonial hearsay and does not implicate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights, as such data is not a statement by a person. The Court also found that the photographs were properly authenticated, no prosecutorial misconduct occurred, and there was no double jeopardy violation in convicting the appellant for both use of a minor in a sexual performance and possession of the same image. The Court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction and found no cumulative error. View "BALDWIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A police officer observed an individual walking in the middle of a street at night near a location known for drug activity. The officer, believing this to be a violation of Kentucky’s jaywalking statute, attempted to stop the individual by asking him to approach the patrol car. The individual ignored the officer’s verbal commands, turned away, and increased his pace. The officer then physically seized the individual by grabbing his arms and escorted him back to the patrol car. During this process, the officer observed the individual discard drugs, which led to his arrest. Additional drugs were found in the individual’s possession after the arrest.The Nelson Circuit Court held a suppression hearing, during which the officer and the defendant’s mother testified. The court found that the officer had probable cause to believe a jaywalking violation had occurred and concluded that the officer’s actions were justified. The court denied the motion to suppress the drug evidence. The defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to amended charges, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, reasoning that an officer may detain a pedestrian for a traffic law violation to issue a citation, and distinguished the case from prior precedent involving different circumstances.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The court held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when police physically seize a person for an observed violation, such as jaywalking, for the purpose of issuing a citation if the person fails to comply with verbal commands. The court found the officer’s use of minimal force to be objectively reasonable under the circumstances and concluded that the subsequent discovery of contraband was not the result of an unreasonable search or seizure. The denial of the motion to suppress and the convictions were affirmed. View "BUECHELE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Bobby Ray Osborne entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, receiving a five-year prison sentence. The case arose when officers, acting on a tip about a stolen trailer, visited Osborne's property. Osborne consented to a search, during which he was found with a baggie containing a brown substance believed to be heroin and a large amount of cash. The officers did not find the stolen trailer but obtained a search warrant for Osborne's residence, yielding additional evidence.The Estill Circuit Court denied Osborne's motion to suppress the heroin and cash, finding that he voluntarily consented to the search. Osborne's subsequent motions to reconsider were also denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case to clarify the distinction between a consensual encounter and an investigative detention under the Fourth Amendment. The court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that Osborne voluntarily consented to the search. The court found that the officers' actions did not convert the consensual encounter into an investigative detention. The court also upheld the application of the plain view doctrine, determining that the incriminating nature of the baggie was immediately apparent once Osborne removed it from his pocket. The court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that additional findings were unnecessary. View "Osborne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Earl K. Johnson was convicted by a jury in Logan Circuit Court on four counts of complicity to traffic in methamphetamine, one count of engaging in organized crime, and one count of complicity to murder. The jury found him to be a persistent felony offender and recommended a life sentence, which the court imposed. Johnson appealed, arguing several trial errors, including a violation of his right to confrontation when a key witness, Pam Wetton, testified remotely due to health concerns.The Logan Circuit Court allowed Pam to testify via Zoom based on a letter from a physician’s assistant stating that travel would be difficult for her. Johnson objected, arguing that this violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The trial court overruled his objection, and Pam testified remotely. Johnson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that allowing Pam to testify remotely violated Johnson’s right to confrontation. The court held that the Commonwealth failed to establish that remote testimony was necessary to further an important public policy and that the reliability of the testimony was assured. The court concluded that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the complicity to traffic convictions, as Pam’s testimony was crucial to those charges. Therefore, the court reversed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for complicity to traffic in methamphetamine.However, the court affirmed Johnson’s convictions and sentences for engaging in organized crime and complicity to murder. The court found that Pam’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for these charges due to the overwhelming evidence of Johnson’s guilt presented by other witnesses. The court also addressed and dismissed Johnson’s other claims of trial errors, including improper admission of other crimes and bad acts, hearsay statements, and the denial of a mistrial. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 1 (S.B. 1), which restructured the relationship between the Jefferson County Board of Education and its superintendent. The bill required the Board to delegate day-to-day operations to the superintendent, limited the Board's meeting frequency, and granted the superintendent additional administrative powers. The Jefferson County Board of Education filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming S.B. 1 violated Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution, which prohibit local or special legislation.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled in favor of the Board, declaring S.B. 1 unconstitutional. The court found that the bill effectively applied only to Jefferson County, thus constituting impermissible local legislation. The court also ruled, sua sponte, that S.B. 1 violated the equal protection rights of Jefferson County residents. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds of Section 59 but did not address the equal protection ruling.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that S.B. 1 did not violate Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court reasoned that the bill's language created an open classification applicable to any county with a consolidated local government, not just Jefferson County. The Court also found that the Board had standing to challenge the bill and that the superintendent was not a necessary party to the action. The Court declined to address the equal protection issue, as it was not properly raised or developed in the lower courts. View "COLEMAN V. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

Donna Miller Bruenger, the ex-wife of the late Coleman Miller, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against Courtenay Ann Miller, Coleman’s daughter, seeking entitlement to Coleman’s Federal Employee’s Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) benefits. Coleman had failed to designate a beneficiary for his FEGLI benefits before his death, and MetLife distributed the benefits to Courtenay. Bruenger argued that Coleman’s legal obligation under a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to assign her the benefits should prevail.The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled against Bruenger, concluding that federal law precluded her claim because Coleman’s employer did not receive the QDRO before his death. Bruenger’s subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely, and the court also imposed sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. Bruenger then sought relief under CR 60.02, which the trial court granted, allowing her to refile the appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the refiled appeal as frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to Courtenay.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the CR 60.02 relief. The Supreme Court held that RAP 11(B) authorizes the award of attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous appeals but found that the imposition of sanctions in this case violated due process because Bruenger was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction but reversed the sanctions imposed by the Court of Appeals. View "BRUENGER V. MILLER" on Justia Law

Blake Jeffreys was arrested during a sting operation after unknowingly communicating with an undercover police officer and arranging to meet at a hotel for sex in exchange for $120. On May 14, 2021, Jeffreys pled guilty to promoting human trafficking. The Jefferson Circuit Court sentenced him to one year in prison, probated for five years, and ordered him to pay a $10,000 fee under KRS 529.130. Jeffreys requested the trial court waive the payment under KRS 534.030(4), but the court declined. Jeffreys appealed, arguing the fee was an unconstitutional excessive fine and should be waived.The Court of Appeals rejected Jeffreys' arguments and affirmed the trial court's decision. Jeffreys sought discretionary review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, focusing solely on the argument that the fee should be waived. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted the motion for review.The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that KRS 529.130 imposes a human trafficking victims service fee, not a fine, and is not subject to waiver under KRS 534.030(4). The court also found that KRS 453.190, which defines a "poor person" for the purpose of waiving court costs, does not apply to the fee imposed under KRS 529.130. However, the court noted that Jeffreys could seek a show cause hearing under KRS 534.020(3)(a)1 to potentially reduce or waive the payment based on his ability to pay. The court emphasized that the trial court should consider various factors, including the defendant's financial status and dependents, when determining the ability to pay. View "JEFFREYS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A group of inmates sentenced to death filed a declaratory judgment action in the Franklin Circuit Court, challenging the validity of the Kentucky Department of Corrections' (DOC) execution regulations. In 2010, the court issued a temporary injunction preventing the execution of an inmate under the then-current lethal injection protocols. The Commonwealth's attempt to dissolve this injunction was denied, and the court's decision effectively halted all executions until a final judgment was rendered.The DOC revised its lethal injection regulations in March 2024, prompting the Commonwealth to request the lifting of the 2010 injunction. The Franklin Circuit Court reserved ruling on this motion, noting that the original protocols were no longer in effect and questioning whether the injunction still applied. The court highlighted that no current death warrants were active and declined to issue an advisory opinion on the amended regulations' constitutionality.The Commonwealth sought interlocutory relief from the Court of Appeals under RAP 20(B), arguing that the circuit court's reservation of ruling effectively modified the injunction. The Court of Appeals recommended transferring the matter to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Both parties supported this transfer, and the Supreme Court accepted the case.The Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed the action without prejudice, ruling that RAP 20(B) does not allow for interlocutory relief from an order that maintains an injunction. The court noted that the circuit court's decision to reserve ruling did not constitute a new or modified injunction and maintained the status quo. The Commonwealth had other potential remedies, such as requesting a definitive ruling or filing a petition for a writ of mandamus, but did not pursue these options. View "DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS V. BAZE" on Justia Law

On December 5, 2020, Covington Police Officer Kevin Igo received a letter alleging that Scott Bitter, a convicted felon, was involved in drug trafficking and had assaulted someone. Officer Igo and other officers went to Bitter's residence to investigate. They conducted a "knock and talk" without announcing themselves as police officers. When Bitter's companion, Susan Hornsby, opened the door, Officer Igo observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, including a scale, baggies, and pills. The officers then conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and later obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery of drugs and a firearm.The Kenton Circuit Court denied Bitter's motion to suppress the evidence, which argued that the initial entry and subsequent search were unconstitutional. The court found that the officers' actions were lawful, as the drug paraphernalia was in plain view and the protective sweep was justified for officer safety. Bitter was convicted by a jury of two counts of trafficking in controlled substances and being a persistent felony offender, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court concluded that Officer Igo's observation of the drug paraphernalia from the doorway was lawful and that the protective sweep was reasonable under the circumstances. The search warrant obtained based on these observations was valid, and the evidence collected was admissible. The court affirmed Bitter's conviction and sentence. View "BITTER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Dennis Keith Sims was convicted by a Casey County jury of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving his granddaughters, nine-year-old D.C. and seven-year-old Z.C. The incidents occurred while the girls stayed with Sims during their mother’s illness. Upon their return, D.C. exhibited behavioral changes and later disclosed inappropriate touching by Sims. Both girls provided testimony, with D.C. detailing multiple instances of abuse and Z.C. confirming inappropriate touching.The Casey Circuit Court sentenced Sims to twenty years in prison, following the jury's recommendation. Sims appealed, raising several issues. He argued that the trial court erred by not administering an oath to the prospective jurors before voir dire, violating his Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the girls to testify outside his presence, and admitting late-disclosed evidence. He also contended that the court improperly excluded certain testimony and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him regarding Z.C.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court found no error in the trial court's failure to administer an oath to the venire, as no rule required it. The court also upheld the decision to allow the girls to testify outside Sims’s presence, citing sufficient evidence of their emotional distress. The court ruled that Sims was not deprived of effective counsel despite being separated from his attorney during the girls' testimony, as he had opportunities to consult with his lawyer. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the late-disclosed evidence and excluding hearsay testimony. Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction related to Z.C., given the testimonies and Sims’s own statements. View "SIMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law