Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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Appellant Jeremy Lawton was convicted of escape in the second degree and of being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict on the charge of second-degree escape, (2) whether the instruction for second-degree escape was flawed and constituted palpable error, and (3) whether the evidence presented supported an instruction for third-degree escape. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals on the issues of the motion for directed verdict and the instruction for third-degree escape, but (2) reversed Appellant's conviction for second-degree escape because an essential element was missing from the jury instruction for second-degree escape such that it actually established a different, uncharged crime, and therefore, the instruction constituted palpable error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Lawton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Christopher Chavies of manufacturing methamphetamine, receipt of stolen property, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Chavies was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld Chavies's convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Chavies's motions to suppress evidence seized during a search of his vehicle; (2) the trial court did not err by denying a directed verdict for the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine; and (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of Chavies's amended and dismissed charges in the penalty phase of the trial, but the erroneous introduction of the charges did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceeding and therefore did not rise to the level of palpable error. View "Chavies v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellant Peter Bard was charged with murder but was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellant was involuntarily institutionalized for treatment for a total of 1,449 days while he was charged. After he had regained competency, Appellant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree manslaughter. The circuit court imposed a twenty-year sentence after addressing Appellant's presentencing custody credit, which was calculated at 3,086 days. Six years later, Appellant was released from custody but reincarcerated after the Department of Corrections (Department) discovered the alleged error in the calculation of Appellant's custody credit and concluded that Appellant should not have been discharged. The circuit court judge then approved and signed an amended time credit sheet prepared by the Department that reduced Appellant's presentencing custody credit to 1,449 days. Appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court deem the judgment against him satisfied. The court denied the motion, finding that the Department had the authority to modify Appellant's presentencing custody credit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department lacked the authority to modify the amount of presentencing custody credit awarded to Appellant in the trial court's sentence because the alleged error in this case was judicial. View "Bard v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Thomas York was found guilty of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) York's Fifth amendment right to remain silent was not violated where he was required to recite a neutral phrase before the jury so the victim could make an in-court identification of York's voice; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying York's motions for a mistrial where (i) certain testimony during the trial did not taint the jury or unduly prejudice York, and (ii) any prejudice resulting from misstatements made during the penalty phase were cured from the judge's admonitions. View "York v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Ronny Walker was convicted of murder, first-degree burglary, tampering with physical evidence, intimidating a participant in the legal process, and tampering with a witness. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the admission into evidence of Walker's entire interrogation video, including Walker's statements to an investigator and the investigator's questions and comments, did not amount to palpable error in the absence of specific objections; (2) the trial court did not palpably err in advising the jurors prior to the attorneys' opening statements how the jurors might go about assessing the credibility of witnesses; and (3) the burglary instruction did not allow for a non-unanimous verdict. View "Walker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Linvil Turpin was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was found to be a first-degree persistent felony offender. On appeal, Turpin contended that his twenty-year sentence was so disproportionate to his offense that it violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence meted out in the case did not run afoul of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as it was within the range authorized by the General Assembly for three-time offenders and was neither so long as to be deemed extreme nor so harsh in the context of a third offense as to be deemed grossly disproportionate. View "Turpin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Scott Stanton pled guilty to first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy. Staton's guilty plea, in which he admitted anal intercourse with his stepson, was conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress two statements he gave to law enforcement officers. Stanton maintained that the officers coerced him to make the incriminating statements by representing that his two children could be removed from the family home pursuant to a court order if he failed to cooperate with the investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly found from the totality of the circumstances that Stanton was not coerced to make the challenged statements. View "Stanton v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellant Larry Ordway was charged with crimes relating to a string of robberies, burglaries, and thefts occurring at, inter alia, a convenience store, a mini storage facility, and a sports equipment retailer. Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery in the first degree, ten counts of burglary in the third degree, six counts of theft by unlawful taking over $300, and receiving stolen property over $300. The Supreme Court (1) reversed nine burglary convictions arising from the mini storage facility because each of the nine instructions were identical and in no way differentiated one count from another, thus depriving Appellant of a unanimous verdict and adequate appellate remedy; (2) vacated one of Appellant's convictions for theft by unlawful taking over $300 because Appellant was convicted of two thefts arising from a single offense, thus implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) otherwise affirmed. View "Ordway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellant James Mullins was convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and persistent felony offender in the first degree. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction for murder and reversed his conviction for tampering with physical evidence, holding that (1) it was insufficient to bring a charge of tampering based solely on the fact that evidence was not found when there were sufficient steps to locate that evidence, and (2) because were was no proof that Appellant acted with the intent to prevent evidence from being available at trial, no reasonable jury could have found Appellant guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Remanded. View "Mullins v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Appellant Marcus Minix received documents from the county mediator stating that the county court had received a complaint against him for a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 514.030 and directing Appellant to mediation. After attending mediation, Appellant was informed he may need to return to mediation. Appellant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ prohibiting the county attorney from referring felony criminal complaints, including a felony complaint against him, to a mediator before presenting the complaints to a district court for review and issuance of a summons or warrant. The court of appeals denied the petition, finding it was without jurisdiction to address Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of prohibition may not be issued against non-judicial parties such as the Appellees, the county attorney and the mediator, and the substantive relief Appellant sought was within the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, not the court of appeals. View "Minix v. Roberts" on Justia Law