Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded. View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder, assault in the first degree, two counts of assault in the fourth degree, driving under the influence of intoxicants, and tampering with physical evidence. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction. During jury selection, fifty jurors were excused for cause. On Appellant’s appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a new trial because of possible interaction between jurors and the murder victim’s mother. On remand, the trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on this issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in failing to strike one of the jurors for cause because she had three associations with Appellant, and there were reasonable grounds to believe that the juror could not render a fair and impartial verdict. View "Sluss v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sexual abuse, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentences, holding that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim had been previously exposed to allegedly pornographic material on the internet; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to strike a juror for cause over defense objection. View "Basham v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the admission of a state police detective’s testimony regarding Appellant’s invocation of his right to an attorney was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court did not err by refusing to allow Appellant’s forensic expert witness to sit with defense counsel during the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witnesses; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter based upon extreme emotional disturbance; and (4) Appellant was not entitled to a new penalty phase trial even though the sentencing protocols as provided for in Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.025(3) were not followed in this case, as this deviation from the statutory procedure did not affect the ultimate sentence or jeopardize Appellant’s right to due process of law. View "Spears v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of third-degree terroristic threatening, other firearm-related offenses, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that a Batson violation occurred as a result of one of the peremptory strikes made by the Commonwealth. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) a Batson violation occurred when the prosecutor struck an African-American juror from the jury pool and failed to provide a cognizable race-neutral reason for striking the juror; and (2) therefore, the trial court’s overruling of Appellant’s Batson challenge was an abuse of discretion. View "Johnson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for killing her husband. Appellant was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a recorded conversation between Appellant and a police detective in which Appellant was consistently silent in the face of accusatory questions. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the admission of the recording violated Appellant’s due process rights by using her silence against her, and the admission of the tape was not harmless error. View "Bartley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree sexual abuse and three counts of first degree sodomy of two victims, Sarah and Nicholas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error that occurred by the admission of hearsay testimony from two of the Commonwealth’s witnesses was not palpable; (2) there was not palpable error in the introduction evidence that Appellant argued was impermissible Ky. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence; (3) Appellant was not unduly prejudiced by the testimonies of Sarah, Nicholas, and other witnesses; (4) any error in the the admission of a picture Nicholas drew in elementary school was not palpable; (5) the trial court did not violate Appellant’s right to a fair trial by failing to excuse a juror; and (6) Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. View "Tackett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was taken into custody after a warrantless search of his vehicle. Defendant was subsequently indicted for handgun- and drug-related offenses. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle. The court of appeals vacated the circuit court’s order suppressing the evidence, concluding (1) the Commonwealth’s appeal was timely filed; and (2) although the search was unlawful, the exclusionary rule did not require suppression because the police officer who searched Defendant’s car followed existing precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth’s notice of appeal was timely filed; and (2) the search in this case was unconstitutional under Arizona v. Gant and Rose v. Commonwealth, but because the search was conducted by an officer in objectively reasonable reliance on clearly established precedent, the exclusionary rule did not apply to exclude the contraband discovered in Defendant’s vehicle. View "Parker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Patrick Darcy and his codefendant, Randy McCleery, Jr., were separately indicted for crimes arising out of the burglary of a residence but were scheduled to be jointly tried. Twelve days before the scheduled trial date, private counsel filed a motion seeking a continuance to enable him to substitute his services for those of the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA), who represented Darcy at all pre-trial proceedings. Darcy’s motion was denied in order to protect McCleery’s statutory right to a speedy trial. After a trial with the DPA continuing to represent Darcy, Darcy was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree fleeing or evading the police, and theft by unlawful taking of property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a continuance of a joint trial requested by a defendant, so long as it is reasonable, is included within the “elastic” clause of Ky. Rev. Stat. 500.110, thus allowing the extension of the statutory speedy-trial time period; and (2) the trial court in this case erred by denying Darcy’s motion for a continuance because its action was based on a seeming misinterpretation of section 500.110. View "Darcy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the murder and repeated sexual assault of his girlfriend. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence against him, particularly the contents of his cell phone depicting him sexually assaulting his girlfriend, should have been suppressed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) refusing to suppress evidence against Appellant, including the videos found on his cell phone; (2) refusing to sever the charges for the sexual assaults on January 15 from those for the sexual assaults and murder on January 16; and (3) ruling that recorded statements of the victim’s children regarding their mother’s purported assailant could not be introduced at trial. View "Hedgepath v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law