Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to murder. Defendant made numerous unsuccessful attempts to contact his attorneys to request their assistance in withdrawing the plea, but defense counsel never acknowledged Defendant’s requests. Defendant orally asked to be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, stating that he had entered the plea involuntarily as a result of the actions of his defense team. The court summarily denied the motion to withdraw. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions and ordered the case remanded for a new trial, concluding that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel refused or failed to file a motion to withdraw the plea on his behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea was a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) Defendant was improperly denied the assistance of conflict-free counsel during that proceeding; and (3) Defendant’s remedy was the vacating of the judgment and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary. View "Commonwealth v. Tigue" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of various sex offenses and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his right to an impartial jury was violated when a probation and parole officer served on his jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s acceptance of the juror at issue waived his right to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to strike the juror for cause; (2) Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim was premature; (3) the trial court did not err in refusing to hear additional character testimony at final sentencing; and (4) the trial court did not err in failing to note Defendant’s presentence custody credit on the final judgment of conviction and sentence. View "Caraway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and taken into custody as a suspect for the murder of his mother. The circuit court halted the allegedly improper questioning of Defendant until Defendant was allowed access to a public defender. Defendant’s father obtained the order from the circuit judge, ex parte, purportedly under the authority of Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.14(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s issuance of the order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Rule 2.14(2) does not provide the trial court with authority to appoint counsel and intercede in the interrogation of an individual in custody before commencement of prosecution where, as a general matter, courts are not vested with general jurisdiction over a criminal matter until the criminal matter becomes a criminal case upon commencement of prosecution; and (2) a motion to suppress is the appropriate means to attack an allegedly improper interrogation resulting from the denial of access to counsel. View "Commonwealth v. Terrell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of fleeing and evading in the second-degree, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence found incident to a Terry stop; (2) abused its discretion by imposing limitations upon Appellant’s hybrid counsel arrangement, but the error was harmless; (3) did not err by admitting evidence of other crimes; (4) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to refer to Appellant’s his post-arrest silence; (5) properly denied Appellant’s motions for a continuance; and (6) did not err by imposing court costs. View "Nunn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and first-degree arson. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for each conviction, to be served concurrently. Before trial, the Commonwealth used seven if its nine peremptory challenges to remove women from the venire. Defendant made a Batson motion challenging the Commonwealth’s use of its peremptory challenges. The trial court concluded that the Commonwealth’s proffered rationales were gender neutral and nonpretextual. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s Batson challenge and impermissibly allowed the Commonwealth to use its peremptory challenges to dismiss female jurors on the basis of gender. View "Ross v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was the subject of two independent cases related to the same victim - one for capital murder and one for capital kidnapping. The convictions in both cases were reversed, and Defendant was retried and again convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s most recent murder conviction and sentence of death. This appeal concerned the parallel kidnapping case, in which, after a retrial, the jury found Defendant guilty of capital kidnapping and other crimes. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the kidnapping. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that evidence of another murder allegedly committed by Defendant and evidence of that murder victim’s background were improperly admitted in this kidnapping case, and the error was prejudicial. View "St. Clair v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant’s conviction of criminal attempt to commit murder and affirmed the remainder of his convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that Defendant’s confession was voluntary and by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his confession; (2) the trial court erred by admitting Defendant’s redacted confession to the jury, and the improper redaction constituted reversible error; and (3) the jury unanimously convicted Defendant of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. Remanded. View "Sykes v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the attempted murder of his fiancee, of first-degree arson, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the trial court (1) did not deny Defendant the right to present a defense by limiting defense counsel’s questioning of the arson investigator; (2) did not err by admitting evidence that Defendant abused his finacee’s pets; (3) did not err by allowing the prosecutor question witnesses about Defendant’s mental illness, anger problems, and status as a non-native eastern Kentuckian; and (4) erred by admitting improper penalty-phase evidence. View "Stansbury v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of fourteen counts of first-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, fourteen counts of incest, and one count each of use of a minor in a sexual performance, complicity to tampering with a witness, and complicity to tampering with physical evidence. The trial court adopted the jury’s recommendation that Defendant consecutively serve the statutory maximum for each conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the complicity convictions but reversed the remaining convictions, holding that the trial court’s jury instructions, except for those pertaining to Defendant’s complicity charges, denied him a unanimous verdict. Remanded for a retrial. View "Martin v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree arson. After finding as a statutory aggravator that Defendant murdered the victim in the commission of first-degree robbery, the jury sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree arson conviction and sentence but affirmed his first-degree murder conviction and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole, holding (1) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence indicating that the victim was alive before the start of the fire, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the first-degree arson charge; and (2) any remaining allegations of error committed by the trial court were either without merit or did not warrant reversal. View "Luna v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law