Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was tried and convicted on the handgun charge. After his trial on this charge, Defendant filed a motion to suppress, his second such motion. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant was subsequently tried on the trafficking charge. During trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from a police officer about Defendant’s testimony at the second suppression hearing. Defendant did not object to this testimony but elected not to testify in his own defense. Defendant was subsequently convicted on the trafficking charge. The court of appeals reversed the trafficking conviction, concluding that the use of Defendant’s suppression-hearing testimony violated his right not to incriminate himself and that the error was palpable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requirement of an objection is a substantive aspect of the constitutional rule that bars palpable error review, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in resorting to that review. View "Commonwealth v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter, second-degree manslaughter, and other crimes. Before final sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that he relied on erroneous legal advice regarding time served when he entered his guilty plea. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Appellant may have received inaccurate advice from his trial counsel about jail-time credit but that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s mistake. View "Greene v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (DUI) after being stopped at a police roadblock conducted by the Kentucky State Police (KSP) at a highway intersection. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence leading to Appellant’s conviction was unconstitutionally obtained because the procedures the KSP employed to set up the roadblock failed to comply with the procedures necessary to implement a suspicionless traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the KSP did not comply with the factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Buchanon substantially enough to render this roadblock a reasonable seizure performed in the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion. View "Commonwealth v. Cox" on Justia Law

Each of these three consolidated cases originated with the filing of an action in the circuit court asserting claims against nursing home facilities for personal injuries suffered by a nursing home resident, violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.510 et seq., and for wrongful death of the resident. At the time of each resident’s admission to the nursing home, the resident’s attorney-in-fact executed a written document providing that disputes arising out of the relationship between the resident and the nursing home would be submitted to arbitration. When each case was commenced, the defendant nursing home moved the circuit court to compel the parties to submit the claims to a formal arbitration proceeding. The circuit court denied the motion in each case, concluding that the respective power-of-attorney instruments did not authorize the resident’s attorney-in-fact to waive the resident’s right to access to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) without a clear and convincing manifestation of the principal’s intention to do so, delegation to an agent of the authority to waive a trial by jury is not authorized, and the principal’s assent to the waiver is not validly obtained; and (2) the arbitration agreements in these cases were never validly formed. View "Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years. The two jury instructions under which Appellant was convicted directed the jury not to consider a specific event but broadly referred to a five-month period. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that, upon application of Johnson v. Commonwealth, Appellant’s constitutional right to a unanimous verdict was violated because (1) at trial, the instructions given to the jury contained no distinguishing descriptions that would fairly apprise the jury of exactly which criminal episode it was charged to consider; and (2) the error was jurisprudentially intolerable. View "Ruiz v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years in prison. On appeal, Appellant argued that that his incriminating utterance to police during his arrest should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search, seizure, and arrest because the policy unlawfully located and identified him during the course of a protective sweep at a Louisville residence, which led to his unlawful arrest and incriminating statement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that suppression of Appellant’s spontaneous utterance was not required because the police officers’ initial entry into the residence was consensual, the scope of the protective sweep was reasonable, the seizure of Appellant was lawful, and Appellant’s incriminating statement was spontaneous and not the product of custodial interrogation. View "Simpson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, Defendants Jared Futrell and Kayla Lord were each convicted of wanton murder for having participated in the killing of Lord’s seventeen-month-old son. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in both cases, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to remove two unqualified jurors for cause, and in accord with Gabbard v. Commonwealth, at least one of the trial court’s two erroneous failures to remove for cause was prejudicial; (2) the jury instructions raised certain unanimous verdict concerns; (3) the trial court erred by allowing Defendants too few peremptory juror challenges; and (4) the trial court erred by disallowing diversion-agreement impeachment cross-examination. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Futrell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence collected from the search of the bedroom of a residence that police officers entered while executing a valid police warrant. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) police may enter a suspect’s residence with a valid arrest warrant when they have reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence and can currently be found inside; and (2) the officers in this case did not exceed the scope of a lawful search under Payton v. New York. View "Barrett v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mary Banker filed a retaliatory discharge claim against the University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc. (ULAA), alleging that ULAA discharged her for engaging in a protected activity under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. A jury found in favor of Banker and awarded attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for dismissal of Banker’s claim, holding that Banker had not met her burden of proof. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals injected its interpretation of the facts and did not view the proof in light most favorable to Banker, and the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that ULAA’s stated reasons for discharging Banker were pretextual; (2) the trial court's award of lost wages was in error; and (3) the trial court’s attorney fee award was reasonable and a proper exercise of its discretion. Remanded. View "Banker v. Univ. of Louisville Athletic Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported to a corrections facility for a court admissible breathalyzer test. Defendant submitted to the breathalyzer test, which registered a blood-alcohol content of more than twice the legal limit. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his breathalyzer test, arguing that his statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney was violated subsequent to his arrest. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The circuit court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commonwealth did violate Defendant’s statutory right to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney under Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.105(3); but (2) because of Kentucky’s implied consent law as set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 189A.103 and the potential penalties attendant thereto, suppression of Defendant’s breathalyzer test results was an inappropriate remedy in this case. Remanded. View "Commonwealth v. Bedway" on Justia Law