Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a patient underwent knee replacement surgery, a suturing needle became dislodged and was lost inside her knee during the procedure. The surgical assistant attempted to locate the needle but was unsuccessful. The surgical team, including the supervising surgeon, searched for the needle and ordered x-rays, which were reviewed by radiologists. The needle was not detected at that time, and the surgery was completed without informing the patient of the possible retained foreign object. Subsequent follow-up appointments and further x-rays revealed the presence of the needle, which was eventually removed in a later procedure. The patient suffered complications requiring additional surgeries and prolonged antibiotic treatment.The patient initiated a medical negligence lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court against the surgical assistant, radiologists, and the hospital. The surgeon settled and was dismissed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the surgical assistant and radiologists, finding that expert testimony was required to establish a breach of the standard of care and that such testimony was absent. The court also determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant and that neither expert identified the radiologists’ standard of care. The patient’s motion to reconsider was denied.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the orthopedic expert could testify against the radiologists despite not being in their specialty, and that expert testimony was not required against the surgical assistant based on res ipsa loquitur exceptions. The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for both the surgical assistant and radiologists. The Court held that expert testimony specifying the applicable standard of care was required in medical negligence cases and was lacking against the radiologists. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant, as the evidence showed no negligence and exclusive control was absent at the relevant time. View "DIAGNOSTIC X-RAY PHYSICIANS, PSC (DXP) V. LLOYD" on Justia Law

The dispute involved two sets of co-owners of a Kentucky limited liability company operating a pharmacy. In 2019, the Dotsons acquired a 50 percent ownership interest from the Ingrams, with a promissory note and security agreement (the “Ingram debt”), making the Dotsons and the Andersons equal owners. In 2023, the Andersons and the LLC filed suit against the Dotsons, who counterclaimed. In early 2024, the parties participated in a mediation and reached a settlement agreement, which was recorded on video during a Zoom call. The mediator recited the terms, including payment arrangements and asset/debt allocations, and the parties affirmed the terms verbally. Subsequently, disputes arose regarding the nature of the Ingram debt (whether corporate or personal), leading both sides to refuse to fulfill their respective payment obligations.The Rowan Circuit Court, after a hearing, found the settlement agreement valid, enforceable, and unambiguous. The court determined the Ingram debt was personal to the Dotsons and not assumed by the Andersons, and held that the agreement did not violate Kentucky’s Statute of Frauds. The court did not address the applicability of Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 99.10. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed and concluded that the requirements of CR 99.10 were satisfied.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. It held that a video recording of an oral settlement agreement, where parties knowingly affirm the terms, constitutes a valid “electronic record” and “electronic signature” under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and satisfies the Statute of Frauds and CR 99.10. The court also found the settlement terms unambiguous and complete, and that the parties mutually assented to them. Issues of alleged breach of contract were deemed premature and not addressed. View "DOTSON V. CIA DRUG, LLC" on Justia Law

Donnell Perry worked as a traffic control flagger for Safe Zone. On March 8, 2023, after working at three different sites that day, Perry was struck by a car while crossing Dixie Highway to return to his job after being permitted by his supervisor to go to a convenience store for a phone charger and cigarettes. Perry’s duties required him to keep his cellphone charged for work communications. At the time of the accident, Perry was wearing his required safety gear. He suffered serious injuries, including fractures and internal injuries, and was later found to have alcohol in his system, though below the legal driving limit.Following the incident, Perry sought workers’ compensation benefits. Safe Zone denied his claim, contending Perry was barred from recovery due to voluntary intoxication and a violation of pedestrian safety statutes. The Administrative Law Judge found that Perry’s injuries were compensable, rejected Safe Zone’s arguments regarding intoxication and safety violations, and awarded him various benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings but remanded for clarification on benefit calculations. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision, agreeing that the current statute did not bar recovery for alcohol intoxication.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the current version of KRS 342.610(4) does not exclude workers’ compensation benefits for employees injured while under the influence of alcohol, as the statute only refers to illegal or nonprescribed substances and prescribed substances taken in excess—not alcohol. The Court also held that Safe Zone did not provide compelling evidence to require a reduction of Perry’s benefits due to a safety violation under KRS 342.165(1), as the ALJ’s findings on Perry’s conduct and intoxication were supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the benefits award in Perry’s favor. View "SAFE ZONE V. PERRY" on Justia Law

A man residing in a Lexington, Kentucky apartment complex was accused of setting fire to his own apartment unit, which spread and endangered several occupants in the building. On the night of the fire, multiple residents and visitors were present, including a minor who was awakened by the blaze and helped alert others. Several people were forced to escape by jumping from a balcony, resulting in serious injuries. When emergency services arrived, the accused was found nearby, barefoot and in pajamas, observing the fire. Witnesses described his behavior as odd, noting that he was smiling and uncooperative with authorities. Investigators determined the fire was intentionally set and discovered a threatening note in his apartment. During the investigation, authorities obtained a recorded jail phone call where he admitted to being inside his apartment sleeping when the fire began.The case proceeded in Fayette Circuit Court, where a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree arson and multiple counts of first-degree wanton endangerment. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. At trial, an issue arose regarding the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the inculpatory jail phone call during discovery, which the defense argued impaired their trial strategy. The trial judge held a hearing on this issue, but ultimately denied both a mistrial and a request to admonish the jury, finding that the error was harmless because other evidence clearly placed the defendant at the scene.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case on direct appeal. The Court found that the Commonwealth did commit a discovery violation by failing to disclose the recorded phone call. However, it held that the error was harmless given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s presence and involvement. The Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial and affirmed the convictions and sentence. View "JORDAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

The case centers on an individual who was arrested on an outstanding warrant and left his cellphone in a car he co-owned with his ex-girlfriend. The ex-girlfriend discovered the phone, accessed its contents, and found sexually explicit photos and videos involving young girls, including her daughter and the defendant’s stepdaughter. She recognized one of the victims by distinctive features and the bedroom background. After notifying another parent and the police, law enforcement secured the phone as evidence. Forensic analysts extracted data from the device using specialized software, producing reports that were then reviewed by an investigating detective. The detective identified further incriminating digital evidence stored in an associated Google Photos account.The Kenton Circuit Court conducted a jury trial where the defendant faced multiple charges, including possession of child sexual abuse material, promoting a sexual performance by a minor, sexual abuse, and rape. The defendant objected to the investigating detective’s testimony regarding the digital evidence reports, arguing that he was not qualified as an expert in digital forensics. The trial court denied motions to exclude this testimony, finding that the detective, with his training and experience, could present such evidence as a lay witness. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, recommending a total sentence of 189 years, which the court capped at 70 years.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the central issue was whether the trial court erred by permitting the detective’s lay testimony about the digital extraction report. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that such testimony did not require expert qualification because interpreting the extracted report fell within the capabilities of a reasonably tech-savvy layperson and did not involve specialized or scientific knowledge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction and the lower court’s evidentiary ruling. View "MCBRIDE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

An employee was injured at work when she fell onto a vendor’s cart and received workers’ compensation benefits from her employer. She also pursued a negligence claim against the vendor responsible for the cart and settled that claim for $295,000. The settlement did not specify the allocation between types of damages. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that one-third of the settlement was for pain and suffering, which is not recoverable in workers’ compensation, and the rest duplicated the workers’ compensation benefits she received. The ALJ calculated the employer’s right to subrogation by reducing the duplicative portion of the settlement by the employee’s attorney fees (40%) and legal expenses, then allowed the employer to immediately recover the benefits it had paid and to receive a credit against future benefits.The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed most of the ALJ’s decision but found a mathematical error in how legal expenses were deducted. The Board clarified that the employer must cover its pro rata share of both attorney fees and legal expenses from the amount available for subrogation, and remanded for correction. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, held that the employer could only begin recovering benefits once the amount it had paid exceeded its share of the employee’s legal fees and expenses, relying in part on prior case law interpreting an earlier version of the statute.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that under KRS 342.700(1), as amended in 2018, an employer’s responsibility for legal fees and expenses is to be subtracted from the duplicative portion of the settlement before subrogation. The employer is entitled to immediate reimbursement for benefits already paid, and a credit for future benefits, after this reduction. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated the Board’s opinion, remanding for correction of the ALJ’s calculation. View "K-VA-T FOOD STORES, INC. V. BLACKBURN" on Justia Law

A man was taken in by a family to help with household chores in exchange for food and shelter. About a week after moving in, he was observed by surveillance cameras at a gas station filling a container with gasoline, which he then brought back to the house. Security footage later showed him entering the family’s porch with the container, then exiting as a fire broke out. The occupants, including an elderly woman and a minor with autism, managed to escape. The house suffered significant fire and smoke damage. The individual returned to the scene during the investigation, gave inconsistent statements to authorities, and was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree arson, three counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and being a persistent felony offender.The Jefferson Circuit Court presided over a jury trial, which found the defendant guilty on all counts. The jury recommended consecutive sentences totaling fifty-two years, but at sentencing, the court ordered some terms to run concurrently, resulting in a total sentence of thirty-two years. The defendant appealed his convictions to the Supreme Court of Kentucky as a matter of right.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Court held that there was no double jeopardy violation in convicting the defendant of both arson and wanton endangerment, as each offense requires proof of elements the other does not. The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the defendant’s request for new counsel, ruling that the defendant did not demonstrate good cause for substitution. Additionally, the Court determined the trial court properly admitted the arson investigators’ expert testimony and allowed limited, relevant background evidence regarding the minor victim’s autism. The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court was affirmed. View "YOUNG V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A group of inmates under death sentences brought a lawsuit in Franklin Circuit Court in 2006 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Kentucky’s execution procedures. They challenged the Kentucky Department of Corrections’ execution protocols, arguing that the protocols had not been properly promulgated as administrative regulations under Kentucky’s Administrative Procedures Act. After the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled in 2009 that formal rulemaking was required, the Department issued new regulations, leading to ongoing litigation as the inmates continued to challenge subsequent amendments to the execution regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, including issues regarding intellectual disability, insanity determinations, attorney access, and execution procedures.After further amendments to the execution regulations in 2023 and 2024, the inmates updated their claims, and the Commonwealth moved to dismiss, arguing the inmates had not exhausted administrative remedies as required by KRS 454.415. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the grievances concerned the validity and constitutionality of regulations—matters not suited for administrative resolution—and that exhaustion was not required. The Commonwealth then petitioned the Supreme Court of Kentucky for a writ of prohibition, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to proceed without exhaustion.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the Franklin Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over declaratory and constitutional challenges to administrative regulations, regardless of whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was required or fulfilled for particular claims. The Court concluded that exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional procedural requirement, and any errors relating to exhaustion can be addressed on appeal after final judgment. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. SHEPHERD" on Justia Law

The case concerns Victor Eugene Gardner, who was convicted in Logan Circuit Court of first-degree rape, second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, two counts of third-degree unlawful transaction with a minor, and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The charges arose from testimony by M.L. that Gardner forced her into sexual intercourse during an overnight stay, supported by evidence from digital communications, law enforcement, and medical testimony. Gardner’s defense highlighted inconsistencies in witness testimony and questioned the medical evidence. During trial proceedings, two notable incidents occurred: a police detective hugged a prospective juror in front of others before voir dire, and later, some jurors discussed testimony before deliberations officially began.Following these incidents, the trial judge excused the jurors who witnessed the inappropriate contact and, after learning of the premature jury discussions, conducted an extensive inquiry by questioning each juror individually. Some jurors admitted overhearing isolated comments about testimony, but none reported that a verdict was discussed or that they had formed an immovable opinion. The trial court denied Gardner’s motions for a mistrial and a directed verdict on the rape charge, and the jury convicted Gardner on all counts, recommending a life sentence, which the court imposed.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial, as the record established that while juror misconduct occurred, it was not pervasive or prejudicial enough to affect the verdict or render the jury partial. The court also ruled there was no palpable error in admitting Snapchat evidence or in the Commonwealth's questioning of a witness, and any error in allowing an officer to recount a witness’s prior statement was harmless. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "GARDNER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A young child, Brianna, suffered injuries consistent with attempted vaginal penetration while attending Room to Grow Preschool in Murray, Kentucky, in 2000. Multiple individuals were suggested as possible perpetrators, including another child, the operator’s teenage son, and Brianna’s own father, but no one was convicted in relation to the injuries. Brianna, through her mother and later in her own right, sued the preschool operator, alleging that his negligence in running the facility, including hiring, training, and supervision, led to her injuries. The preschool’s insurer, Monroe Guaranty, intervened, seeking a declaration that its policy did not require it to defend or indemnify the preschool or its operator.In the Calloway Circuit Court, Monroe Guaranty was granted declaratory and summary judgment, with the court finding that the injury arose from a violation of law and thus was excluded under the policy’s terms. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the injury as the triggering event and finding that it was intentional and within the insured’s control. The case was previously reviewed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which remanded for more thorough factual findings and coverage analysis. On remand, the trial court again granted judgment for Monroe Guaranty, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding no coverage existed under either the general liability or professional liability provisions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky, on discretionary review, affirmed the Court of Appeals as to the commercial general liability policy, holding coverage was not triggered because the insureds had control over the relevant events. However, it reversed as to the professional liability endorsement, finding the lower courts failed to conduct a proper coverage analysis. The case was remanded to the Calloway Circuit Court for a complete factual and legal evaluation under the professional liability endorsement. View "ROBINSON V. MONROE GUARANTY INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law