Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld an appellate court's decision in a workers' compensation claim involving claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Lewis Hicks, a Kentucky resident, was injured in West Virginia while working for Southeastern Land, LLC, a subsidiary of Booth Energy. Despite receiving medical and income benefits from Southeastern Land's West Virginia workers' compensation insurance carrier, Hicks filed a workers' compensation claim in Kentucky. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in Kentucky, and hence awarded him benefits. However, the Court of Appeals reversed, determining Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the appellate court's decision. The court noted that the primary issue was whether Hicks' employment was "principally localized" in Kentucky, thereby allowing for benefits under Kentucky law, or in West Virginia, thereby disallowing Kentucky benefits. The court concluded that while Southeastern Land conducted business in both states, the majority of Hicks' work time was devoted to his employment responsibilities at the West Virginia job site. As such, his employment was "principally localized" in West Virginia, disqualifying him from Kentucky's workers' compensation benefits. View "HICKS V. KEMI" on Justia Law

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The case originates from a dispute over the jurisdiction for a child custody matter. The parties involved are Justin Aldava and Alyssa Baum, parents of H.A., a child born in Texas in 2019. The couple moved from Texas to Kentucky, then to Washington for Aldava's work, and back to Texas. Eventually, Baum and H.A. moved back to Kentucky. In November 2020, Baum filed a petition for an order of protection in Kentucky, indicating she sought temporary custody of H.A. Aldava filed a custody petition in Texas in December 2020. The issue arises from the interpretation of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), specifically the definition of "home state" and "temporary absence".The Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that under the UCCJEA, a bright-line, objective standard should be used to determine a child's "home state" - focusing on where the child has lived in the six months preceding the custody proceeding, and not the intent of the parties. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Texas nor Kentucky had initial jurisdiction over H.A. when custody was first raised, as H.A. had not lived in any state long enough to establish "home state" status. However, Kentucky obtained temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to Baum's petition for an order of protection. Consequently, Kentucky was the only state with any jurisdiction over H.A., and the custody action should be heard there. The court concluded that the Texas court's later finding that Texas was H.A.'s home state did not divest Kentucky of jurisdiction. The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. View "ALDAVA V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

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A man, convicted of murder, tampering with physical evidence, and possession of a handgun by a felon, appealed his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The case centered around the shooting death of a bar owner. The defendant argued that he shot in self-defense during a struggle, but the prosecution argued that the defendant was the initial aggressor, pointing to high-quality security camera footage that captured the events leading up to and following the shooting.The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the defendant was not in custody when initially questioned at the hospital, so his Miranda rights were not violated. The Court also ruled that the trial court did not err in issuing an "initial aggressor" limitation to the jury's self-defense instructions, as the defendant’s act of pointing a gun at the victim constituted "physical force" under Kentucky law. Finally, while the trial court erred in the manner it polled the jury, the Supreme Court found the error was not "palpable" and would not have changed the result of the case. View "BOWMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed a dispute over the division of proceeds from the sale of a commercial property. The parties involved were business partners who had formed an LLC to manage the property. One of the partners, Allen, had previously asked his partners to sell their interests in the LLC to his children to resolve a tax problem. The partners agreed, but wanted to ensure they would not forfeit potential future profits from the property sale. They decided that proceeds from a future sale of the building would be split according to their ownership interests up to $8 million, and any proceeds above $8 million would be divided equally among them.In 2017, the property sold for $10 million, and a dispute arose over how to distribute the proceeds. One of the partners, Swyers, distributed the proceeds according to the previously agreed upon formula. However, the Allen family contested this, arguing that the entire proceeds should have been distributed according to ownership interests.The trial court ruled in favor of Swyers, finding that the agreement provided for a bifurcated distribution of proceeds, with an $8 million sale price threshold. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that distributions of one-third each were warranted only if the total net proceeds exceeded $8 million.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, agreeing with the trial court's interpretation of the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had intended to split the proceeds on a sale price threshold of $8 million, and that only the sales commission needed to be deducted before calculating the distribution of the final $2 million of the sale price. View "SWYERS V. ALLEN FAMILY PARTNERSHIP #1" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Kentucky has removed Joseph “JS” Flynn from his position as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk following allegations of inappropriate workplace behavior. Flynn was appointed in 2016 and elected in 2018. In March 2022, a complaint was lodged against Flynn by a former employee, alleging several incidents of inappropriate behavior. Flynn admitted to having a brief sexual relationship with the complainant, his subordinate, in 2021, which he did not report, and to physically poking and verbally abusing his employees.Other allegations against Flynn included pulling the complainant into a car back seat, forcefully kissing her, and exposing himself. Flynn denied these allegations, claiming physical impossibility due to two surgically inserted rods in his back. Furthermore, the complainant alleged that Flynn would regularly touch her inappropriately and put his hand up her dress. Another employee corroborated many of these allegations.Based on the evidence provided during a three-day hearing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that Flynn had created a hostile work environment and engaged in quid pro quo harassment. The Court noted that Flynn failed to perform his duties with courtesy and respect, thereby tarnishing the judiciary's reputation. As a result, Flynn was removed from his position, and the Office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk was declared vacant. Flynn was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. View "IN RE: FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK" on Justia Law

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In this case, Bennett D. Couch was convicted by the Kenton Circuit Court for possession and transfer of child pornography in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 531.335 and 531.340. The conviction was based on evidence procured through search warrants for Couch's Tumblr account, apartment, cell phones, and computers. The investigation was initiated after the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) reported that three pornographic images of children were being circulated online, which were traced back to Couch's IP address. Couch challenged the constitutionality of KRS 531.330’s presumption as to minority and the legality of the search of her apartment.The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice VanMeter, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Couch's constitutional challenge was not considered as she failed to provide the required notice to the Attorney General. Regarding the legality of the search, the court determined that the search warrant affidavits provided substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude that probable cause existed to issue the original search warrant, despite Couch's claims that the affidavits lacked probable cause, failed to identify the criminal statutes violated, and did not establish a nexus between the criminal activity and her apartment. The court also dismissed Couch's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and failure of the trial court to properly consider the Presentence Investigation Report due to lack of procedural compliance. View "Couch v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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In November 2013, Ahmad Rashad Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud and theft by deception for defrauding Medicaid of $14,505.36 by falsifying timesheets over two years. In May 2014, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Davis entered into a plea agreement in which Davis agreed to plead guilty to Medicaid fraud, and in exchange, the Commonwealth recommended to the trial court that Davis's theft by deception charge be dismissed. The trial court accepted Davis's guilty plea and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, probated for three years or until restitution was paid in full, and dismissed the theft by deception charge. In December 2021, Davis filed a petition to expunge the theft by deception charge. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Davis's guilty plea to Medicaid fraud, making it ineligible for expungement under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.076(1)(b). The circuit court granted Davis's petition without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a circuit court can look beyond the sentencing court's final judgment to determine whether a dismissal was granted in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge. The court ruled that the circuit court erred in failing to do so in Davis's case. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the circuit court's order granting expungement. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

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In 2024, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case of Kory E. Helmick who was convicted by a Greenup County jury of two counts of sodomy in the third degree, one count of sodomy in the first degree, one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, and one count of unlawful use of an electronic communication system to procure a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activity. The victim, J.K., was a minor in foster care who lived with Helmick and Helmick’s husband intermittently from the age of 13 to 15. Helmick appealed his conviction, arguing three points of error: the trial court's denial of his request to postpone the trial, insufficient proof supporting the sodomy in the first degree conviction, and violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy due to convictions for both sodomy in the first degree and in the third degree.The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected all three allegations. First, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Helmick's request to postpone the trial. The request was based on the desire to conduct a forensic analysis of the victim's cell phone, but the court found Helmick had ample time to conduct this analysis before the trial and did not provide an affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained from the phone, which was required for such a request.Second, regarding the sufficiency of the proof for the sodomy in the first degree conviction, the court found that there was more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the conviction. The victim's testimony that he was "incapacitated" and "incapable of moving" due to alcohol intoxication was seen as evidence that he was physically helpless during the sexual abuse, a requirement for a conviction of sodomy in the first degree.Finally, the court rejected Helmick's double jeopardy claim, finding that his convictions for sodomy in the first and third degrees were based on separate criminal acts and thus did not violate his right to be free from being tried twice for the same offense.The Supreme Court of Kentucky therefore affirmed the judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court. View "Helmick v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case heard before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the primary issue was whether the Breathitt Circuit Court correctly dismissed Teresa Spicer's lawsuit against James Combs for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Spicer's suit arose from damages linked to Combs' actions, following a fatal ATV accident which resulted in the death of Tiara Combs, James Combs’ wife and Spicer's daughter. Prior to the lawsuit, Combs and Spicer, as co-administrators of Tiara's estate, had signed a release settlement with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, effectively absolving both Combs and Progressive of any further liability relating to the accident.After learning that Combs was intoxicated at the time of the accident, a fact he allegedly hid from her, Spicer sought to sue Combs personally for IIED. Combs moved to dismiss Spicer's complaint on the grounds that the previous release signed by Spicer barred her claim, and that her complaint did not meet the standard for an IIED claim. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the release was intentionally broad and included all potential claims, including IIED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, ruling that the release did not prevent Spicer from asserting a personal cause of action against Combs. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court ruled that the language of the release only covered claims possessed by the estate and not Spicer's individual claims. Furthermore, the Court held that Spicer's complaint was sufficient to proceed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving it to the circuit court to resolve whether Spicer can sufficiently establish her claim at a later time. View "COMBS V. SPICER" on Justia Law

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In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice. View "MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC." on Justia Law