Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Earlywine was employed as a teacher by the Board of Education of Paris Independent School District (BEP) from August 2007 to June 2019. In 2011, a student accused him of inappropriate conduct, leading to his placement on paid administrative leave, which was later changed to unpaid leave. He faced a criminal charge of Sexual Abuse in the First Degree, but the trial court granted him a directed verdict in January 2015, and the charge was expunged. Earlywine was reinstated in February 2015 but was terminated in 2019 for unspecified reasons. In 2020, he sued BEP to recover lost wages during his unpaid leave.The Bourbon Circuit Court initially handled the case, determining that BEP was within the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1) but transferred the case to Franklin Circuit Court due to venue appropriateness. BEP appealed, arguing governmental immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals ruled that BEP's immunity was waived under KRS 45A.245(1) but concluded that Earlywine's failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case, affirming that BEP is subject to the waiver of immunity under KRS 45A.245(1). However, it reversed the Court of Appeals' conclusion regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, stating that this issue is subject to exceptions and should not have been addressed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court remanded the case to Franklin Circuit Court for further proceedings, allowing Earlywine to argue any applicable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. View "BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARIS, KENTUCKY V. EARLYWINE" on Justia Law

Jennifer Albright, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased son David Albright, filed a lawsuit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) following David's death. David was swept into a drainage pipe in their backyard during a rainstorm and subsequently died from his injuries. The drainage system, including the pipe, was owned by MSD. Albright alleged that MSD was negligent in maintaining the drainage system and failing to warn of its dangers, particularly by not installing a grate over the pipe entrance.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of MSD, finding that MSD was entitled to municipal immunity under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA). The court reasoned that MSD's decision not to install grates was a discretionary act protected by CALGA. Albright appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that MSD was not entitled to immunity under the facts of the case.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that MSD, while subject to CALGA, was not entitled to immunity because the alleged negligent acts were ministerial in nature, not discretionary. The court emphasized that municipalities have a ministerial duty to non-negligently maintain and repair their sewer systems. The court also found that MSD's decision not to install a grate or warn of the pipe's dangers did not arise from its legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER DISTRICT V. ALBRIGHT" on Justia Law

Walter Bedford Jr., an attorney admitted to practice law in 1974, prepared a will for Clara Howard Jackson in 2016, naming himself as executor and Margaret Hayes as the sole beneficiary. After Jackson's death in 2019, Bedford delayed filing the probate petition and missed court dates. He was eventually appointed executor but failed to manage the estate properly, writing checks to himself for unearned fees and depleting the estate's funds. Hayes, the beneficiary, had to hire another attorney to remove Bedford as executor and filed a bar complaint against him.The Inquiry Commission issued a three-count charge against Bedford for failing to act with diligence, failing to safekeep the estate property, and failing to return estate funds after removal as executor. Bedford admitted to these violations. He requested to be placed on Honorary Membership Inactive Status and proposed a negotiated sanction of a public reprimand and repayment of the unearned fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the proposed sanction and found it appropriate. The Court noted similar cases where public reprimands and repayments were ordered for comparable misconduct. Considering Bedford's substantial experience, lack of prior discipline, personal hardships, and remorse, the Court concluded that a public reprimand and repayment of the unearned fee were suitable sanctions.The Supreme Court of Kentucky publicly reprimanded Bedford and ordered him to repay $5,979.00 to the estate within one year. Bedford was also directed to pay the costs associated with the disciplinary proceedings. View "In re Bedford" on Justia Law

Attorney Jon Rhyan Fritz was admitted to practice law in Kentucky in 1998. He was retained by client Vera Williams to pursue a wrongful termination claim against her employer, House of Bread and Peace (HBP). Williams paid Fritz a $3,500 flat fee, which he deposited into his general business account without a written advance fee agreement. Fritz failed to provide billing statements or memoranda explaining how he was earning the fee. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigated Williams's case but ultimately declined to pursue it further. Fritz did not respond to Williams's subsequent emails or requests for meetings, and no lawsuit was filed against HBP within the statute of limitations.Williams filed a Bar Complaint against Fritz, leading the Office of Bar Counsel (OBC) to open the matter for informal resolution. Fritz responded to initial inquiries but failed to provide Williams's client file as requested. The Inquiry Commission charged Fritz with multiple violations of the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), including lack of diligence, communication, and safekeeping of property. Fritz did not respond to the formal Charge, and attempts to serve him were unsuccessful, leading to constructive service via the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) Executive Director.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that Fritz failed to answer the Charge or participate in the disciplinary process. The court granted the OBC's motion to indefinitely suspend Fritz from practicing law in Kentucky. Fritz is required to notify all courts and clients of his suspension, cancel pending advertisements, and take steps to protect his clients' interests. The suspension order takes effect twenty days after its entry. View "In re Fritz" on Justia Law

A father was found to have neglected his child by the Calloway Circuit Court after a school resource officer (SRO) detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the father's vehicle during a school drop-off. The child, who was six years old, was also found to have behavioral issues at school and tested positive for marijuana exposure. The father tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and oxycodone, although he had a prescription for the latter. The family court concluded that the father’s substance use created a risk of physical injury to the child.The father appealed the decision to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which reversed the family court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the family court’s decision was clearly erroneous, asserting that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services had not provided sufficient evidence that the father's actions resulted in a risk of physical or emotional injury to the child.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the family court's order. The Supreme Court held that the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the SRO’s testimony, the Cabinet investigator’s observations, and the drug test results. The Supreme Court concluded that the father’s actions, including smoking marijuana in an enclosed vehicle with the child and driving under the influence, created a reasonable potential for harm, thus constituting neglect under Kentucky law. View "Commonwealth v. K.O." on Justia Law

Seventeen-year-old Tyler Delonjay was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Jefferson County, Kentucky, in August 2020, resulting in injuries to Jessica Hill and the loss of her pregnancy. Tyler had been in the sole legal custody of his father, Jason Delonjay, for nine years, although he was not physically staying with his father at the time of the accident. Instead, Tyler was staying with his aunt, Suzanne Small, and various friends due to disputes with his father. Tyler's father had an insurance policy with State Farm that provided coverage if Tyler qualified as a "resident relative," defined as one who "resides primarily" with the named insured.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, denying coverage, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals found the policy language clear and unambiguous, concluding that Tyler was not living at his father's house when the accident occurred, and thus did not qualify as a "resident relative."The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the term "resident relative" was ambiguous, especially considering Tyler's status as a minor and the family court custody orders. The Court noted that Tyler had lived with his father for 97% of the time in the nine years preceding the accident and that legal custody remained with his father. The Court held that ambiguous terms in an insurance policy should be construed in favor of coverage. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the summary judgment in favor of State Farm and remanded the case to the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Jessica Hill. View "Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dillian Ford was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay $10,972 in jail fees for the 422 days he was held in custody. The jail fees were imposed based on a stipulation that Carlisle County would pay McCracken County twenty-six dollars a day for housing inmates. Ford challenged the imposition of these fees, arguing that there was no evidence of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body, as required by KRS 441.265(2)(a).The Carlisle Circuit Court imposed the jail fees based on the stipulation. Ford appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of the fees. Ford then sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, arguing both the lack of evidence for the jail fees and a new argument regarding an amendment to KRS 441.265(1)(a) that he claimed removed the trial court's authority to impose jail fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that the stipulation regarding the agreement between Carlisle and McCracken counties did not meet the evidentiary burden required by Capstraw v. Commonwealth. The Court held that there was no evidence in the record of a jail reimbursement policy adopted by the county jailer with the approval of the county's governing body. Therefore, the imposition of jail fees was not justified. The Court vacated the portion of Ford's sentence imposing the jail fees but did not address the validity of the fifteen-year sentence for the underlying convictions. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "Ford v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (LJCMG) entered into a contract with Omni Louisville, LLC (Omni) in 2014, which included the demolition of Liberty Hall. In 2019, the Metro Council directed the Historic Landmarks and Preservation Districts Commission to review Liberty Hall for landmark status. Despite the Commission's vote to designate Liberty Hall as a landmark, the Metro Council overturned this decision in 2021, citing various reasons including the building's association with racism and lack of architectural significance.The Louisville Historical League, Inc. (LHL) sought review in the Jefferson Circuit Court, which found that the Metro Council had violated procedural due process, concluding that the decision was predetermined due to the 2014 contract with Omni. The court held that the hearing was a pretext and that the decision was tainted by blatant favoritism and conflict of interest.The Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the issue of jurisdiction, concluding that LHL failed to allege particularized injury or aggrievement, thus depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held that strict compliance with statutory requirements was necessary for jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals, clarifying that the requirement to plead particularized injury or aggrievement pertains to particular-case jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held that the judiciary has inherent constitutional authority to review administrative decisions for arbitrariness, and compliance with statutory requirements affects particular-case jurisdiction. The Court also reversed the Jefferson Circuit Court's conclusion of procedural due process violations, affirming the Metro Council's decision to overturn the landmark designation of Liberty Hall. View "Louisville Historical League, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government" on Justia Law

Melzena Moore pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter of Raymond Jackson under extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as part of a plea agreement. The issue on appeal is whether the Laurel Circuit Court erred in denying Moore the domestic violence exemption to the mandatory minimum sentence for parole eligibility. This exemption would allow Moore to be considered for parole after serving 20% of her eighteen-year sentence and qualify her for counseling and rehabilitation programs.The Laurel Circuit Court found that Moore was a victim of domestic violence based on a single corroborated incident but concluded that her shooting of Jackson did not occur "with regard to" the domestic violence. The court denied Moore the exemption, citing a lack of corroborating evidence for her account of the events leading up to the shooting and questioning her credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, instructing the trial court to grant the exemption, arguing that the trial court failed to properly apply the "some connection" standard and did not adequately consider the expert testimony provided by Moore.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its analysis by not making sufficient factual findings regarding the totality of the evidence of domestic violence. The court emphasized that the "some connection" standard does not require a direct causal link or contemporaneous act of domestic violence. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further factual findings and proper application of the legal standard to determine if Moore qualifies for the domestic violence exemption. View "Commonwealth v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kimberly Deramos lived in an apartment complex owned by Anderson Communities. While returning from a walk with her Shih Tzu, Princess, they were attacked by a pit bull allegedly owned by a neighboring tenant. Princess died, and Deramos sustained injuries requiring surgery and counseling. Deramos sued Anderson Communities, claiming they negligently failed to maintain a safe environment for tenants.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Anderson Communities' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying on the strict liability dog-bite rule in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 258.235(4). The court concluded that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under KRS 258.095(5) and thus could not be held strictly liable. Deramos did not cite this statute in her complaint but instead alleged general negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that Anderson Communities was not an "owner" under the statute and did not address Deramos's negligence claim.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the strict liability dog-bite statute was inapplicable to Deramos's negligence claim. The court emphasized that negligence and strict liability are distinct legal concepts, and Deramos's complaint sufficiently alleged negligence. The court concluded that the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence claim based on strict liability principles. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Deramos v. Anderson Communities, Inc." on Justia Law