Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A certified nursing assistant employed by a home health provider sustained injuries to her right shoulder and lower back during the course of her employment. She received medical treatment from several providers and was paid mileage reimbursements for traveling between patient homes. Following her injuries, the employer’s insurance carrier denied further payment of temporary disability and medical benefits, including an outstanding medical bill, and ultimately terminated her employment. The worker secured new employment at a higher wage and subsequently filed for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming entitlement to disability benefits and payment of the disputed medical bill. The employer denied liability.The Administrative Law Judge found that the worker had a compensable lower back injury with a 12% impairment rating, entitling her to temporary total and permanent partial disability benefits, but excluded mileage reimbursements from her average weekly wage and denied payment for the outstanding medical bill based on the provider’s failure to submit it within the statutory 45-day deadline. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of mileage reimbursements and dismissed the issue of the unpaid medical bill as moot after the employer voluntarily paid it during the appeal. The Court of Appeals also rejected a motion for leave to file an amicus brief, deeming it unauthorized.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the exclusion of mileage reimbursements from the wage calculation, holding such payments were reimbursements for actual expenses and not “wages.” The Court reversed the dismissal of the medical bill claim as moot, applying the “voluntary cessation” exception, and held that denial of compensability constitutes reasonable grounds to excuse noncompliance with the 45-day rule for submitting medical bills. The Court also found the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the amicus motion. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "HARRIS V. MERCY HOME HEALTH" on Justia Law

Douglas Hodge and Timothy Shane, both parolees, challenged the procedures used by the Kentucky Parole Board to revoke parole. Hodge’s parole was revoked after he failed to report his new address and absconded, following difficulties with his living arrangements and subsequent lack of communication with his parole officer. Shane was revoked after being caught driving under the influence and violating a condition prohibiting alcohol use. In each case, the final evidentiary hearing was conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), not the Parole Board itself, with both parolees represented by counsel and able to present evidence and witnesses.For Hodge, the Kenton Circuit Court dismissed his petition, finding the two-hearing process and the Board’s review complied with Morrissey v. Brewer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding due process was satisfied and the Board did not abuse its discretion. Hodge sought discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Shane’s claim was denied by the Franklin Circuit Court, which concluded the Board could delegate the final hearing to an ALJ. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding statutory and constitutional requirements mandate the Parole Board itself conduct final revocation hearings, but found Shane’s appeal moot due to his release, applying the public interest exception.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed both cases to resolve conflicting appellate rulings. It held that the Kentucky Parole Board is authorized to delegate the conduct of final parole revocation hearings to ALJs, provided the Board retains the ultimate decision-making authority. However, the Court determined that due process is not fully satisfied unless parolees have an avenue, such as the ability to file exceptions to the ALJ’s findings, to present arguments directly to the Board. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in Hodge’s case and affirmed the appellate decision in Shane’s case. View "HODGE V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

The case concerns Michael Gibbs, who was convicted in Hopkins County, Kentucky, of multiple sexual offenses involving three minor victims. The victims, all girls under the age of twelve at the time of the offenses, were friends, and two were frequent visitors at Gibbs’ home. One victim reported to police that Gibbs gave her marijuana and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The police investigation, which included interviews and extraction of messages and images from cell phones, uncovered sexual abuse of two additional minors. The crimes included rape, incest, sexual abuse, possession and distribution of child sexual images, and promoting sexual performances by a minor.In the Hopkins Circuit Court, Gibbs moved to sever the charges relating to each victim, arguing that the cases were too dissimilar to be tried together. The court denied the motion, finding that the crimes showed a common scheme or plan, as all the victims were young, friends of each other, and the offenses occurred in the same location and time frame. The court also allowed one victim, Alice, to testify via closed circuit television due to her post-traumatic stress disorder and developmental delays, based on testimony from her therapist. The jury convicted Gibbs on all charges except for one and recommended a life sentence, which the trial court imposed.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed Gibbs’ appeal as a matter of right. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever, finding sufficient similarities and a logical relationship among the offenses to justify joinder. The Court also upheld the decision to allow Alice to testify via closed circuit television, reaffirming that child victims who were under twelve when the crimes occurred may testify this way even if they are older at trial, provided they are still children. The judgment of the Hopkins Circuit Court was affirmed. View "GIBBS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Jeremy Starr, a delivery driver for Graybar Electric, claimed workers’ compensation for a back injury sustained in March 2018 while unloading pipes. Starr had a history of lumbar issues stemming from a 2004 motor vehicle accident, including a disc herniation documented by MRI. After his workplace injury, Starr underwent further imaging and treatment, ultimately receiving lumbar fusion surgery in 2022. Medical opinions diverged: some attributed the need for surgery to degenerative changes originating from the earlier accident, while others suggested the work injury was a significant cause. Starr provided additional evidence, including new medical evaluations and a deposition from his surgeon, to argue the surgery was compensable.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially found Starr suffered only a lumbar strain from the workplace incident and ruled the fusion surgery was not work-related, thus non-compensable. The ALJ awarded temporary total disability benefits for a limited period and later amended the award upon reconsideration. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s findings, concluding that any factual misstatement was not so unreasonable as to compel a different result and that new evidence submitted by Starr did not meet the standard for “newly-discovered evidence,” having been available with due diligence.The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ should have considered Starr’s additional evidence and correcting factual misstatements, reasoning that interlocutory orders are not final and that contested issues remained open for adjudication. Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court held that under Bowerman v. Black Equipment Co., dispositive interlocutory factual findings cannot be reversed in a subsequent final opinion absent newly-discovered evidence, fraud, or mistake. The Court found no gross injustice from the ALJ’s factual misstatement and determined the additional evidence was merely cumulative and not newly discovered. View "GRAYBAR ELECTRIC V. STARR" on Justia Law

Russell Amboree was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree possession of a controlled substance, which are Class D felonies under Kentucky law, and a Class B misdemeanor for marijuana possession. The jury recommended that Amboree receive the maximum three-year penalty for each possession conviction, to be served consecutively for a total of six years, and forty-five days for marijuana possession to be served concurrently. At sentencing, Amboree objected, arguing that a six-year sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for these offenses, but the Henderson Circuit Court imposed the consecutive sentences as recommended.Amboree appealed, contending that the sentence violated the statutory maximum. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed the relevant statutes and cases, including Eldridge v. Commonwealth, and found that KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) prohibits any application of KRS Chapter 532 that would increase the term of incarceration for possession convictions beyond three years. The Court of Appeals vacated Amboree’s six-year sentence, ruling that consecutive sentences for multiple convictions under this statute cannot exceed three years in total.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review to resolve whether consecutive sentences for Class D possession offenses could exceed three years. Applying a de novo standard of review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of KRS 218A.1415(2)(a) unambiguously limits the maximum term of incarceration for first-degree possession convictions to three years, regardless of any provision in KRS Chapter 532, including those authorizing consecutive sentences. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate Amboree’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that aggregate consecutive sentences for these offenses cannot exceed three years. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. AMBOREE" on Justia Law

Two men were killed in Louisville, Kentucky, after being shot near an intersection. Investigators received eyewitness accounts and surveillance footage identifying a green Chevrolet Tahoe with unique features as the vehicle involved. Further investigation linked Edgar Hernandez to the vehicle, including corroborating cell phone data placing him near the scene and statements he made to his ex-girlfriend implicating himself in the shootings. Police observed Hernandez in possession of a handgun and driving the Tahoe. Hernandez was arrested outside his home without a warrant, searched, and a gun was found on his person. He was then interviewed at the police station, where he was advised of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver, and confessed to the murders. He was indicted for two counts of murder and tampering with physical evidence.The Jefferson Circuit Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Hernandez’s motion to suppress his confession and evidence obtained after his arrest. He argued that the arrest was unlawful due to lack of probable cause and that his confession was involuntary. The trial court denied the suppression motion, finding the arrest was supported by probable cause, the search incident to arrest was proper, Hernandez had been adequately informed of his rights, and his confession was not coerced. Hernandez entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The trial court sentenced him to a total of twenty-five years’ imprisonment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the trial court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard and considered legal questions de novo. The Court held that the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause, the search incident to arrest was lawful, and Hernandez validly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court found no evidence of coercion or police misconduct that would taint his confession. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court. View "HERNANDEZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A vehicle driven by the defendant struck a pedestrian, causing serious injuries. The defendant was indicted for assault, wanton endangerment, and driving under the influence. A public defender, Amy Miller, was appointed as counsel. At a bond hearing, Miller made detailed statements about the defendant’s medical conditions and medications, suggesting the accident resulted from an acute medical emergency. Later, the Commonwealth argued Miller’s statements conflicted with disclosures by the defense’s medical expert, raising the possibility that Miller might be called as a witness at trial, thereby creating a conflict under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(3.7)(a).After extensive proceedings, the Kenton Circuit Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to disqualify Miller, reasoning that her statements would likely be introduced for impeachment and that she could become a necessary witness. The court found that continuing with Miller as counsel could prejudice the defendant and noted that substitute counsel lacked Miller’s familiarity with the case. The defendant petitioned the Kentucky Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the disqualification order, arguing she lacked an adequate remedy by appeal and would suffer irreparable injury. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, holding that an appeal after conviction would be an adequate remedy.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that, under the circumstances, a later appeal would not be an adequate remedy and the defendant would suffer great and irreparable injury if deprived of her chosen counsel at such a late stage. The Court found the trial court’s disqualification order was speculative and unsupported by sufficient findings that Miller would be a necessary witness at trial. The Supreme Court ordered issuance of the requested writ of prohibition, barring enforcement of the disqualification order. View "SCHULKERS V. LAPE" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in February 2018 for several traffic-related offenses, including fourth-degree driving under the influence, second-degree driving on a DUI-suspended license while under the influence, and being a persistent felony offender. Concerns about his mental health led to multiple competency evaluations at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center, resulting in conflicting reports: one finding him competent, another finding him incompetent due to religious delusions, and a final evaluation concluding he was competent after successful treatment with antipsychotic medication. The appellant’s initial plea agreement resulted in a twenty-year sentence, which was probated for five years.After the trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence, the appellant moved to vacate, arguing the persistent felony offender charge was treated incorrectly as a standalone conviction. The Todd Circuit Court denied this motion, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, citing palpable error and procedural mistakes regarding probation revocation. The Supreme Court of Kentucky then vacated the sentence for the persistent felony offender charge and remanded for resentencing on the two Class D felonies.Upon resentencing, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed whether the appellant was competent to be resentenced and whether the amended twenty-year sentence was legal. The Court held that the trial court correctly found the appellant competent, based on substantial evidence from the final psychiatric evaluation. The Court further held that the twenty-year aggregate sentence for the two Class D felonies, enhanced by the persistent felony offender conviction and ordered to run consecutively, was lawful under Kentucky statutes governing consecutive sentences and persistent felony offender enhancements. The judgment of the Todd Circuit Court was affirmed. View "MOORE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization and several school boards challenged Kentucky House Bill 9, which authorized state funding for charter schools, alleging it violated Sections 183, 184, and 186 of the Kentucky Constitution. The bill permitted charter schools to receive public funds but allowed them to operate independently from local school districts, with enrollment caps and admissions preferences that could exclude some eligible children. Charter schools were also exempt from certain state and district regulations applicable to public schools.The Franklin Circuit Court reviewed the case and found that HB 9 was inconsistent with the constitutional requirement for an efficient system of common schools. The court concluded that using tax dollars to support charter schools violated constitutional provisions reserving education funding for common schools and public schools only. As a result, the circuit court enjoined the implementation of HB 9 and prohibited the expenditure of tax dollars for charter schools under the statute.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted motions to transfer the appeals directly to its docket. Upon review, the Court held that charter schools authorized by HB 9 do not qualify as “common schools” or “public schools” as contemplated by Sections 183, 184, and 186 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court determined that charter schools’ admission limitations, lack of local district oversight, and exemption from certain regulations placed them outside the constitutionally protected common school system. Therefore, funneling public education funds to charter schools under HB 9 is unconstitutional. The Court affirmed the Franklin Circuit Court’s decision, upholding the prohibition on public funding for charter schools unless voter approval is obtained as provided in Section 184. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. COUNCIL FOR BETTER EDUCATION, INC." on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital for liver disease and, while in an altered mental state, fell while accompanied by a caregiver. She suffered a fractured hip, requiring surgery, and was later discharged. The patient filed a negligence lawsuit against the hospital, alleging a failure to prevent or appropriately respond to her fall. During discovery, she requested all incident reports related to her fall. The hospital identified an Incident Report and a Root Cause Analysis but refused to produce them, invoking federal and state privileges that protect certain internal analyses and reports of medical errors.The McCracken Circuit Court ordered the hospital to produce the Incident Report and to provide the Root Cause Analysis with redactions for portions covered by federal privilege. The trial court found that the Incident Report and parts of the Root Cause Analysis contained factual information not otherwise available in the patient's medical records and ruled that such information should be discoverable. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's order after the hospital sought a writ of prohibition. It held that the Incident Report was not privileged under federal or state law but concluded the Root Cause Analysis was fully protected by federal privilege, even its factual portions, and thus could not be disclosed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege protected the entire Root Cause Analysis from disclosure, with no exception for factual information within the document. However, it held that the Incident Report was not protected by either the federal or state privileges because it was generated in compliance with regulatory obligations, not as part of the hospital's privileged peer review or patient safety evaluation system. As a result, the Incident Report was discoverable, while the Root Cause Analysis was not. View "BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. V. KITCHEN" on Justia Law