Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nathan O’Bannon worked for a coal company for four years, primarily performing strenuous labor in confined spaces, which required repetitive heavy lifting and awkward physical positions. He claimed that this work resulted in cumulative trauma injuries to his neck, back, shoulders, and knees. After his employment ended, O’Bannon filed a workers’ compensation claim, testifying about his pain, physical limitations, and inability to return to mining work. Medical evaluations offered conflicting opinions: one doctor, Dr. Gilbert, diagnosed significant permanent impairment attributable to O’Bannon’s coal mining work and assigned a 40% whole person impairment rating, while two other doctors, retained by the employer, disputed the work-relatedness of his injuries and offered lower or no impairment ratings.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found O’Bannon’s injuries were caused by his employment and awarded him permanent partial disability and medical benefits, relying mainly on Dr. Gilbert’s assessment. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, partially reversed, finding that Dr. Gilbert’s 10% impairment rating for the cervical spine did not strictly adhere to the AMA Guides and that separate impairment ratings were needed for each shoulder and wrist. The appellate court remanded those claims for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that strict adherence to the AMA Guides is not required so long as the medical opinion is grounded in them. The Court found Dr. Gilbert’s ratings were sufficiently supported by the evidence and not meaningfully contested by other experts. It also concluded that, since the evidence did not differentiate between the severity of injuries in each shoulder or wrist, separate ratings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part, reinstating the ALJ’s full award to O’Bannon. View "O'BANNON V. MUHLENBERG COUNTY COAL CO." on Justia Law

A married couple, both professionals with comparable early earnings, married in 1984 and relocated multiple times for the wife’s advancing career. The husband, after resigning from several positions to facilitate these moves, became a stay-at-home father in 2002. By 2012, their children were emancipated. The wife continued her successful career, while the husband remained unemployed. In 2020, the couple separated, and the wife initiated a dissolution action. At the time of separation, the marital estate was valued at nearly $12 million, increasing to over $19 million by the time of trial due to the wife's employment compensation and appreciation of assets.The Jefferson Family Court conducted a trial to resolve disputes over property classification, division of marital assets, and spousal maintenance. The court divided the marital estate equally, including post-separation increases, and awarded the husband $15,000 per month in maintenance, among other rulings. Both parties moved to alter the judgment, but their motions were largely denied. They then appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which affirmed the equal division of marital property and maintenance award, but remanded for reclassification of certain stock units, offsetting an advance to the husband, and reassessment of attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the matter. It held that the family court erred by presuming an equal division of marital property based on statutory interpretation, rather than applying the plain language of Kentucky Revised Statutes § 403.190(1), which requires division in “just proportions” with consideration of specific statutory factors. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded for a new property division analysis without presuming equality. The Supreme Court also instructed the family court to reconsider the maintenance award, ensuring full findings on statutory criteria are made. View "DALL V. DALL" on Justia Law

Between February 2017 and March 2022, a man was accused of repeatedly sexually abusing his younger daughter, O.G., in various locations, including a playhouse at her grandparents’ residence. The abuse began when O.G. was around five and continued through her preteen years, involving acts such as inappropriate touching, attempted rape, sodomy, and incest. The incidents came to light when O.G. disclosed them to a friend, who encouraged her to tell an adult. O.G. then informed her grandmother, leading to involvement from law enforcement and child protective services. During the investigation and at trial, O.G. provided detailed testimony about the abuse, while her older sister denied any abuse and testified to having no memory of such incidents.The case proceeded to trial in the Logan Circuit Court. The jury convicted the defendant of first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree sodomy, first-degree attempted rape, and first-degree incest, ultimately recommending a sentence of life imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Throughout the trial, several evidentiary and procedural issues arose, including the jury being instructed on both incest and sodomy, a juror allegedly mouthing words to the victim, the admissibility of a social worker’s letter regarding unsubstantiated abuse claims toward another child, and the admission of certain video recordings.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the defendant challenged the trial court’s decisions on these issues. The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that instructing the jury on both incest and sodomy did not violate double jeopardy, as each offense requires proof of an element the other does not. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the juror’s conduct, exclusion of the Cabinet letter, or admission of the contested video evidence. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Logan Circuit Court. View "GUEVARA V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

After a car accident in Kentucky, an injured party’s insurer paid $10,000 in basic reparation benefits (PIP/BRB) for his medical expenses. Before the injured party’s bodily injury claims against the at-fault driver were resolved, his insurer demanded—and received—a $9,000 subrogation payment from the at-fault driver’s liability insurer. Later, the injured party settled his personal injury claim with the at-fault driver for the remaining $41,000 of the liability policy limits and signed a release. He then sued his own insurer, seeking repayment of the $9,000, arguing that the subrogation payment was premature under Kentucky’s Motor Vehicle Reparations Act because he had not been fully compensated (“made whole”).In the Ohio Circuit Court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court ultimately dismissed the action, reasoning that any claim for repayment should be against the at-fault driver’s insurer, not the injured party’s own insurer, as there was no statutory or contractual obligation requiring the BRB carrier to reimburse the injured party. The court rejected arguments based on unjust enrichment and bad faith.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the injured party could pursue repayment from his own insurer for the premature subrogation, possibly under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and suggested KRS 446.070 might provide a remedy.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that Kentucky law does not impose a duty on the BRB (PIP) carrier to ensure the injured party is made whole before accepting subrogation, and any risk of premature payment falls on the liability carrier, not the BRB carrier. The Court also held that KRS 446.070 and unjust enrichment do not support a cause of action for repayment against the BRB carrier, nor do claims of bad faith. The judgment of the trial court was reinstated. View "ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY V. JARNIGAN" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, after consuming alcohol, drove at excessive speeds—approximately 99 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone—and caused a fatal head-on collision in Erlanger, Kentucky. The victim, who was trapped in his vehicle and sustained severe injuries, died after several weeks in the hospital due to a brain hemorrhage. The defendant’s blood alcohol content at the time of the crash was estimated to be 0.243, over three times the legal limit. After the victim’s death, the defendant was indicted for murder, criminal mischief in the first degree, wanton endangerment in the first degree, and aggravated DUI, second offense.The case was tried in Kenton Circuit Court. The defendant moved to dismiss the murder charge, arguing that the newly enacted vehicular homicide statute (KRS 507.060, known as Lily’s Law) precluded prosecution for wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b). The trial court denied this motion, and the jury was instructed on wanton murder, vehicular homicide, and manslaughter in the second degree. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed several claims of error. The court held that the enactment of the vehicular homicide statute does not preclude prosecution for wanton murder, as the statutes have distinct elements and are not in true conflict. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting certain prior bad acts evidence, allowing limited victim background testimony, admitting autopsy photographs, refusing to instruct on reckless homicide, or in the Commonwealth’s closing arguments. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court. View "JACKSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

Several inmates serving life sentences in Kentucky challenged actions by the Kentucky Parole Board regarding their parole eligibility. Historically, the Board had the authority to require inmates to “serve out” their life sentences, making them ineligible for future parole consideration. In January 2021, the Board issued a new policy, called a “Directive,” which retroactively converted all previous serve-out orders for life sentences into ten-year parole deferments, thereby granting those inmates new parole eligibility hearings. After legal challenges were raised, including a temporary restraining order by the Laurel Circuit Court, the Board rescinded the Directive and canceled the scheduled parole hearings.The inmates filed complaints for declaratory judgment in the Franklin Circuit Court, arguing that the Board’s actions in rescinding the Directive and canceling the parole hearings violated their rights. The Commonwealth contended that the Directive was unlawful from its inception because it bypassed required administrative procedures. The Franklin Circuit Court found that the Directive violated multiple statutes and regulations, including requirements under Kentucky law that such policy changes be promulgated as administrative regulations through a formal process. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. For one appellant, Halvorsen, the court also determined that several of his claims were barred by the statute of limitations.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Franklin Circuit Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board’s Directive constituted an administrative regulation and was void and unenforceable because it was not promulgated according to statutory requirements. The Court also found that the Board’s actions violated the Open Meetings Act, relevant statutes, and existing regulations. Additionally, it held that the Board was authorized to rescind the Directive and cancel the newly granted parole hearings, and that certain claims were untimely. View "SHOLLER V. KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD" on Justia Law

Police officers executed a nighttime search warrant at an individual’s residence. The resident, who was home with his young children, claimed he did not initially hear police announcing their presence. After retrieving his daughters from the basement and attempting to destroy evidence, he opened the door for police and complied with their commands by kneeling and raising his hands. The resident alleged he was then struck in the face with a rifle butt by an officer, causing severe injury, before physically resisting arrest once on the ground. He later required reconstructive surgeries for his injuries. After pleading guilty under North Carolina v. Alford to resisting arrest, he filed a civil suit against several officers, asserting state law claims of excessive force, civil assault, and civil battery based on events before he began resisting.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the plaintiff’s Alford plea collaterally estopped him from arguing the officers acted in bad faith, thus entitling them to qualified official immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the Alford plea necessarily implied an acknowledgment of the officers’ good faith in performing their duties during the arrest, thereby barring the plaintiff’s civil claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. It held that an Alford plea does not automatically preclude subsequent civil claims unless the plea colloquy includes express admissions to the underlying facts forming the elements of the crime. In this case, the Alford plea only acknowledged a factual basis for resisting arrest and did not address whether the officers used excessive force before the plaintiff resisted. The Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the alleged excessive force and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NORTHERN-ALLISON V. SEYMOUR" on Justia Law

A Florida limited liability company owned commercial property in Louisville and was advised by its attorneys to lock out a tenant for unpaid rent and sell the tenant’s property to satisfy a lien. The tenant subsequently sued for conversion and other claims, resulting in a multimillion-dollar judgment against the company and its principals. During the litigation, a second, similarly named Kentucky LLC was formed, but it was never made a defendant in the original suit. While appeals were pending, the Kentucky LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and a settlement agreement was reached, contingent upon approval by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that substantively consolidated the two LLCs for purposes of the bankruptcy, after which the property was sold to satisfy creditors.In the Jefferson Circuit Court, the Kentucky LLC brought malpractice claims against the attorneys, alleging negligent advice and mishandling of the defense. The Florida LLC and its principal later filed similar claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding the Kentucky LLC was not the client and had no claim, and that the Florida LLC had surrendered its claim through bankruptcy proceedings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed the Kentucky LLC could not maintain the claim, but held the Florida LLC retained the claim since assignment was prohibited; however, it found the claims time-barred because the statute of limitations began at settlement execution.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the dismissal of all claims. It held that the Kentucky LLC was not owed a client-based duty and did not own the malpractice claim. The court determined that the statute of limitations for malpractice began when the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order made the settlement binding, not at the earlier settlement execution. Because the operative complaint was filed more than a year after this accrual date, all claims were time-barred. The cross-appeals were dismissed as moot. View "MILLERS LANE CENTER, LLC V. MORGAN & POTTINGER, P.S.C." on Justia Law

Charles L. Hinkel, III experienced chest pain at home and, after his son called 911, emergency responders Kristian Brock (an EMT) and Christopher Stone (a paramedic) were dispatched to assist. They used a phone app called “Active 911” for navigation, but due to darkness, rain, and poor lighting, they initially missed the house, arriving about sixteen minutes after dispatch. After bringing Hinkel to the ambulance, he suffered cardiac arrest, and the defibrillator malfunctioned. The responders stopped at another paramedic’s home to get a working defibrillator and continued resuscitation, but Hinkel was pronounced dead at the hospital. Hinkel’s estate sued Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, alleging negligence related to their navigation choices and equipment checks.The Henry Circuit Court dismissed claims against Henry County EMS and the defendants in their official capacities but denied summary judgment for Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, finding their actions involved ministerial duties not protected by qualified official immunity. Rather than immediately appealing, Brock and Stone proceeded to trial, which ended in a mistrial. Afterward, they filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Brock and Stone forfeited their right to an interlocutory appeal by proceeding to trial rather than appealing the immunity denial before trial. The Court clarified that once trial begins, the summary judgment record is superseded and further appellate review of immunity must occur on the trial record, not the pretrial record. The Court also found it lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine in these circumstances. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "BROCK V. HINKEL" on Justia Law

After a patient underwent knee replacement surgery, a suturing needle became dislodged and was lost inside her knee during the procedure. The surgical assistant attempted to locate the needle but was unsuccessful. The surgical team, including the supervising surgeon, searched for the needle and ordered x-rays, which were reviewed by radiologists. The needle was not detected at that time, and the surgery was completed without informing the patient of the possible retained foreign object. Subsequent follow-up appointments and further x-rays revealed the presence of the needle, which was eventually removed in a later procedure. The patient suffered complications requiring additional surgeries and prolonged antibiotic treatment.The patient initiated a medical negligence lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court against the surgical assistant, radiologists, and the hospital. The surgeon settled and was dismissed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the surgical assistant and radiologists, finding that expert testimony was required to establish a breach of the standard of care and that such testimony was absent. The court also determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant and that neither expert identified the radiologists’ standard of care. The patient’s motion to reconsider was denied.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the orthopedic expert could testify against the radiologists despite not being in their specialty, and that expert testimony was not required against the surgical assistant based on res ipsa loquitur exceptions. The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for both the surgical assistant and radiologists. The Court held that expert testimony specifying the applicable standard of care was required in medical negligence cases and was lacking against the radiologists. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant, as the evidence showed no negligence and exclusive control was absent at the relevant time. View "DIAGNOSTIC X-RAY PHYSICIANS, PSC (DXP) V. LLOYD" on Justia Law