Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2013, Ahmad Rashad Davis was indicted for Medicaid fraud and theft by deception for defrauding Medicaid of $14,505.36 by falsifying timesheets over two years. In May 2014, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Davis entered into a plea agreement in which Davis agreed to plead guilty to Medicaid fraud, and in exchange, the Commonwealth recommended to the trial court that Davis's theft by deception charge be dismissed. The trial court accepted Davis's guilty plea and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, probated for three years or until restitution was paid in full, and dismissed the theft by deception charge. In December 2021, Davis filed a petition to expunge the theft by deception charge. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the charge was dismissed in exchange for Davis's guilty plea to Medicaid fraud, making it ineligible for expungement under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 431.076(1)(b). The circuit court granted Davis's petition without holding a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and reversed the decisions of the lower courts.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a circuit court can look beyond the sentencing court's final judgment to determine whether a dismissal was granted in exchange for a guilty plea to another charge. The court ruled that the circuit court erred in failing to do so in Davis's case. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and vacated the circuit court's order granting expungement. View "COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

In 2024, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case of Kory E. Helmick who was convicted by a Greenup County jury of two counts of sodomy in the third degree, one count of sodomy in the first degree, one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, and one count of unlawful use of an electronic communication system to procure a minor to engage in sexual or other prohibited activity. The victim, J.K., was a minor in foster care who lived with Helmick and Helmick’s husband intermittently from the age of 13 to 15. Helmick appealed his conviction, arguing three points of error: the trial court's denial of his request to postpone the trial, insufficient proof supporting the sodomy in the first degree conviction, and violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy due to convictions for both sodomy in the first degree and in the third degree.The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected all three allegations. First, the court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Helmick's request to postpone the trial. The request was based on the desire to conduct a forensic analysis of the victim's cell phone, but the court found Helmick had ample time to conduct this analysis before the trial and did not provide an affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained from the phone, which was required for such a request.Second, regarding the sufficiency of the proof for the sodomy in the first degree conviction, the court found that there was more than a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the conviction. The victim's testimony that he was "incapacitated" and "incapable of moving" due to alcohol intoxication was seen as evidence that he was physically helpless during the sexual abuse, a requirement for a conviction of sodomy in the first degree.Finally, the court rejected Helmick's double jeopardy claim, finding that his convictions for sodomy in the first and third degrees were based on separate criminal acts and thus did not violate his right to be free from being tried twice for the same offense.The Supreme Court of Kentucky therefore affirmed the judgment of the Greenup Circuit Court. View "Helmick v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this case heard before the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the primary issue was whether the Breathitt Circuit Court correctly dismissed Teresa Spicer's lawsuit against James Combs for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Spicer's suit arose from damages linked to Combs' actions, following a fatal ATV accident which resulted in the death of Tiara Combs, James Combs’ wife and Spicer's daughter. Prior to the lawsuit, Combs and Spicer, as co-administrators of Tiara's estate, had signed a release settlement with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, effectively absolving both Combs and Progressive of any further liability relating to the accident.After learning that Combs was intoxicated at the time of the accident, a fact he allegedly hid from her, Spicer sought to sue Combs personally for IIED. Combs moved to dismiss Spicer's complaint on the grounds that the previous release signed by Spicer barred her claim, and that her complaint did not meet the standard for an IIED claim. The circuit court dismissed the action, holding that the release was intentionally broad and included all potential claims, including IIED.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, ruling that the release did not prevent Spicer from asserting a personal cause of action against Combs. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court ruled that the language of the release only covered claims possessed by the estate and not Spicer's individual claims. Furthermore, the Court held that Spicer's complaint was sufficient to proceed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leaving it to the circuit court to resolve whether Spicer can sufficiently establish her claim at a later time. View "COMBS V. SPICER" on Justia Law

In 2019, Keith McWhorter and his wife, Carol, filed a lawsuit against Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., alleging medical negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs failed to file a certificate of merit as required by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 411.167, a law enacted to reduce meritless lawsuits against medical providers. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice due to this omission. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing they had complied with the requirements of KRS 411.167(7) and that the defendant had waived the certificate of merit argument by not including it in their initial answer. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that none of the issues the plaintiffs raised were properly preserved for appellate review, as they did not call these errors to the attention of the trial court. However, the court did note that had the claim of compliance under KRS 411.167(7) been properly before the court, they would have held that a plaintiff must file this information with the complaint. As a result, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, dismissing the case with prejudice. View "MCWHORTER V. BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to determine whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments to KRS 413.249, which extended the statute of limitations for civil claims of childhood sexual assault and abuse, could be applied retroactively to revive claims that were already time-barred. The case arose out of the alleged sexual abuse of Samantha Killary by her adoptive father, Sean Jackman, and others. Killary filed a lawsuit against Jackman and others in 2018, after Jackman was convicted of the abuse. However, the defendants argued that the claims were time-barred under the 2007 version of KRS 413.249, which was in effect when the abuse occurred. The trial court and Court of Appeals disagreed on whether the 2017 and 2021 amendments could be applied retroactively to revive Killary's claims.The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that while KRS 413.249 is a remedial statute that should be applied retroactively, the defendants had a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense that was not overcome by the addition of a new triggering event in the 2017 and 2021 amendments. Furthermore, the court found that the 2021 amendment's provision for the revival of time-barred claims did not apply to Killary's claims because they were already time-barred at the time of the amendment's enactment. The court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims against the defendants. The court based its decision on a long line of Kentucky cases holding that a vested right to assert a statute of limitations defense cannot be divested by retroactive legislation. View "Thompson v. Killary" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky analyzed KRS 411.167, a law requiring claimants to file a certificate of merit alongside their complaint. The plaintiff, Mario Sanchez, had filed a suit against doctors and the medical facility, but without a certificate of merit. The trial court dismissed the case because Sanchez failed to comply with KRS 411.167. Sanchez appealed, arguing that the certificate requirement only applied to parties representing themselves, and that his responses to the defendant's discovery requests effectively complied with the statute. The Court of Appeals disagreed with Sanchez's interpretation but remanded the case back to the trial court to determine if Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit was due to excusable neglect under CR 6.02.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed that KRS 411.167 applies to all claimants, whether represented by counsel or not, and rejected Sanchez's argument that he technically and substantively complied with the statute. The court ruled that strict compliance with the statute was required, rendering the statute effectively meaningless if only substantial compliance was necessary. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand the case back to the trial court, stating that Sanchez's failure to adequately request relief under CR 6.02 at the trial court level should not benefit him now. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice due to Sanchez's failure to file a certificate of merit. View "MCMILLIN, M.D. V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

In a case involving Steven Roark who was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine, and tampering with physical evidence, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which had held that the jury instruction for manufacturing methamphetamine violated Roark's right to a unanimous verdict. In the case, the police had found Roark in a trailer with an active methamphetamine lab, along with multiple items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The jury instructions allowed for a conviction based on either of two theories under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1432 - either that Roark knowingly manufactured methamphetamine, or that he knowingly possessed two or more items of equipment or chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Roark argued that such instruction violated his right to a unanimous verdict. However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found no error in the jury instruction, concluding that both theories were supported by the evidence presented at trial, and thus did not violate Roark's right to a unanimous verdict. The court thereby affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court as to Roark’s manufacturing conviction. View "Commonwealth v. Roark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Kentucky dealt with a case regarding a patient, Ronald N. Arnsperger, Jr., who claimed he suffered injuries due to the negligent actions of a hospital staffer at Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. Arnsperger had undergone surgery for his left ankle and later claimed that his injuries were caused by an incident in which his left ankle made contact with a desk while being transported in a wheelchair by a hospital staffer. The Boone Circuit Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, agreeing with its argument that expert medical testimony was needed to establish causation. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that this was a simple negligence case and no expert medical testimony was required.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the summary judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court's decision hinged on the question of whether the injuries Arnsperger claimed to have suffered were caused by the allegedly negligent actions of the hospital staffer. Given Arnsperger's extensive medical history involving his left ankle, the Court held that the question of causation was not within the common knowledge of the jury and thus, expert medical testimony was necessary. The Court concluded that Arnsperger had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and under no circumstances could his claim succeed due to the lack of expert testimony on causation. View "Saint Elizabeth Medical Center, Inc. v. Arnsperger" on Justia Law

In a case concerning the constitutionality of the Kentucky General Assembly's legislative and congressional reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court's decision that the plans were constitutional. The appellants, which included the Kentucky Democratic Party and several individual voters, challenged the plans, alleging that they were the result of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, violated the Kentucky Constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, and freedom of speech and assembly, and violated Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets forth requirements for the reapportionment process. The court held that the apportionment plans did not involve an unconstitutional level of partisan gerrymandering and did not violate the state constitution's guarantees of free and equal elections, equal protection, freedom of speech and assembly, or Section 33's requirements for the reapportionment process. The court applied a substantially deferential standard in its review, given the political nature of the apportionment process. It found that the plans did not involve a clear, flagrant, and unwarranted deviation from constitutional limitations, nor did they threaten the state's democratic form of government. The court also found that the appellants had standing to bring their claims and that the claims were justiciable. View "GRAHAM V. ADAMS" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed the procedural issue of whether a notice of appeal could be filed electronically in a termination of parental rights (TPR) case that had been sealed. The court had to interpret the relevant statutes and rules, which stated that TPR cases should be sealed upon the entry of the final order and that sealed cases were not eligible for electronic filing. The Court of Appeals had ruled that the appellant had complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the rules were ambiguous about whether a TPR case could be electronically filed after it had been sealed.However, the Supreme Court of Kentucky disagreed with the lower court. It held that the statutory law and administrative rule, read together, effectively prohibited a notice of appeal from being electronically filed in a TPR case. The Court found no ambiguity in this interpretation. It pointed out that the rules clearly stated that TPR cases were always confidential but would only be sealed upon the entry of the trial court’s final order. Once sealed, these cases were no longer subject to mandatory electronic filing.Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that the appellant had not complied with the rules for timely filing a notice of appeal, as the notice should have been filed conventionally. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s termination of the appellant's parental rights. View "CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES V. D.W." on Justia Law