Justia Kentucky Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that the federal Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA) was preemptive of Kentucky's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and that thoroughbreds and the right to breed them are farm products within the meaning of the FSA and, as a result, any security interest in those products was extinguished when they were sold to their respective buyers.The FSA abrogated a common exception in the UCC allowing for a security interest to remain when a farm product pass from seller to buyer. At issue in this case was (1) whether the FSA applies when the product at issue was a thoroughbred horse with particularly valuable breeding rights, and (2) whether breeding rights are farm products within the FSA. The Supreme Court held (1) the FSA preempts Kentucky's farm products exception; and (2) the plain language of the FSA demonstrates that thoroughbred horses are farm products within the meaning of the FSA, and breeding rights are also farm products under the FSA. View "MGG Investment Group LP v. Bemak N.V., Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this case alleging that Defendants breached their duties under the Farm Animals Activity Act by failing to make a reasonable inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage a horse named Flash before letting her ride the horse, holding that Defendants were not liable under the statute.When Plaintiff visited a stable owned by Defendants to test-ride horses for sale she was injured when she was thrown by Flash. Plaintiff sought compensation for her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Court of Appeals revered, finding that Defendants had a duty to make a reasonable and prudent inquiry into Plaintiff’s ability to manage flash before letting her ride the horse and that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding Plaintiffs allegation that defendants caused Plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants reasonably determined that Flash was suitable for Plaintiff to ride based upon Plaintiff's representations; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Defendants’ liability under the statute. View "Daugherty v. Tabor" on Justia Law

The language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 258.235(4) imposes strict liability upon the owner of a dog that attacks and injures a person.Plaintiff sued Defendant after Defendant’s dogs attacked and injured her, relying on section 258.235(4). After the conclusion of the evidence, Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested instruction requiring an imposition of liability upon Defendant solely by showing Defendant’s ownership of the dogs that attacked her. The jury determined that Defendant was the owner of the dogs that caused injury to Plaintiff but that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the jury instructions properly stated the law of a dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his dog. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that a dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person and that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a dog bite case may be considered in measuring the damages awarded to her. View "Maupin v. Tankersley" on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. In this case the attack occurred across the street from the rented property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landlords under Ireland v. Raymond, which held that a landlord's liability for attacks by a tenant's dog does not extend to attacks that occur off the leased premises. The court of appeals affirmed, also relying on Ireland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord can be an "owner" of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances; (2) any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (3) for that reason, the landlord in this case was not liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. The Supreme Court held that (1) landlord can be the owner of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances, but any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (2) for that reason, the landlord in this case could not be liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law